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THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1937*
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article presents a descriptive profile of the United States
Supreme Court since the constitutional revolution of 1937. The dis-
cussion covers four major periods and their subdivisions. First came
the Roosevelt Court (1937-46), which had an early period (1937-41)
in which the liberals took control from the conservative old guard
and a later period (1941-46) in which the Roosevelt appointees split
into two warring factions.' Second was the more conservative Vinson
Court (1946-53), with its early period of polarization (1946-49) and
its subsequent period of conservative dominance (1949-53).2 Third
was the more liberal Warren Court (1953-69), which had an early
period of emerging liberal activism (1953-57),' a middle period of
retrenchment and restraint (1958-62)," and a third period of liberal
dominance (1962-69).' Fourth came the Burger Court (1969-pre-
sent),6 which was a period of conservative dominance.
To set the stage, a brief description of the Supreme Court just
before the constitutional revolution of 1937 is in order.7 During the
© 1984 by Russell W. Galloway.
* Supreme Court History Project, Publication No.8:
* Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia
University School of Law; Ph.D., 1970, Graduate Theological Union; Director, Supreme
Court History Project; member, California bar.
1. See Galloway, The Roosevelt Court: The Liberals Conquer (1937-1941) and Divide
(1941-1946), 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 491 (1983).
2. See Galloway, The Vinson Court: Polarization (1946-1949) and Conservative Dom-
inance (1949-1953), 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375 (1982).
3. See Galloway, The Early Years of the Warren Court: Emergence of Judicial Liber-
alism (1953-1957), 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 609 (1978).
4. See Galloway, The Second Period of the Warren Court: The Liberal Trend Abates
(1957-1961), 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 947 (1979).
5. See Galloway, The Third Period of the Warren Court: Liberal Dominance (1962-
1969), 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 773 (1980).
6. See Galloway, The First Decade of the Burger Court: Conservative Dominance
(1969-1979), 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 891 (1981).
7. For a more detailed discussion of the years preceding the constitutional revolution of
1937, see Galloway, The Court That Challenged the New Deal (1930-1937), 24 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 65 (1984).
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October 1935 Term, the Court waged war against the New Deal,
and struck down a variety of federal and state anti-depression pro-
grams.8 The following table shows the alignment of Justices at that
time.9
TABLE I
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES-OCTOBER 1935 TERM
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Cardozo Hughes McReynolds
Brandeis Butler
Stone Sutherland
Van Devanter
Roberts
On the far right were the so-called four horsemen: Van Devanter,
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler, laissez faire conservatives all.
Justice Roberts joined them in the October 1935 Term after several
earlier Terms in the Court's center. Chief Justice Hughes walked a
tightrope between the conservative and liberal blocs, first leaning one
way, then another. The liberal trio, Justices Brandeis, Stone, and
Cardozo, held down the left wing, dissenting as a bloc in several
important and controversial anti-New Deal decisions.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Roosevelt Court (1937-46)"
1. The Roosevelt Court's Early Years: The Liberals Take
Control (1937-41)
The Roosevelt Court began with the constitutional revolution of
8. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (5-4 decision)
(minimum wage legislation); Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S.
513 (1936) (5-4 decision) (bankruptcy); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (5-4
decision) (Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (6-3
decision) (Securities Act of 1933); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (6-3 decision)
(Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935) (6-3 decision)
(state income tax).
9. Similar tables showing alignments of Justices will be presented later. In each case,
Justices in the "liberal" and "conservative" columns are listed in the order of their alignment
at the time as determined by statistical analysis of their voting patterns. This means, of course,
that each Justice's position is based upon a comparison with the other Justices on the Court of
that period, not upon any absolute measure of liberalism and conservatism.
10. See C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS
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1937. In February 1937, President Franklin Roosevelt responded to
the Court's attack on the New Deal by announcing his famous
Court-packing plan. The following month, the Court made an ab-
rupt about-face and seceded from the role of constitutional censor of
economic reform legislation. Beginning with the landmark cases
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish" and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.," the Court announced that the era of constitutional
laissez faire was over.
Initially the constitutional revolution of 1937 was carried out
without a single personnel change. Making the famous "switch in
time that saved nine," Justice Owen Roberts broke ranks with the
conservative four horsemen and created a new majority by lining up
with Chief Justice Hughes and the three liberals, Brandeis, Stone,
and Cardozo.
Dissent rates on the right promptly jumped to more than triple
the level of the prior Term; dissent rates on the left dropped by more
than two-thirds. The liberals took control and set in motion the two
major trends that characterized the Roosevelt Court: judicial re-
straint in economic cases and liberal activism in civil liberties cases. 8
In the next few years, the old guard began to retire, enabling
Roosevelt to secure the constitutional revolution begun in 1937 by
appointing New Dealers to fill their seats. First, the conservative
Van Devanter resigned on June 2, 1937, and Hugo Lafayette Black
replaced him.' 4 Black, the Alabama "people's lawyer" and radical
New Dealer, was probably more liberal than any prior Justice in
Supreme Court history. He promptly staked out a position by him-
self on the far left.
A second conservative, Sutherland, resigned on January 18,
1938, and Roosevelt selected then Solicitor General Stanley F. Reed
AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1948); Galloway, supra note 1.
11. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (5-4 decision) (substantive due process; state minimum wage
law for women upheld).
12. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (5-4 decision) (federal commerce power; National Labor Rela-
tions Act upheld).
13. In addition to the Parish and Jones & Laughlin cases, famous liberal victories dur-
ing the October 1936 Term included Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (7-2 decision)
(spending power; Social Security old age benefits program upheld); Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (5-4 decision) (spending power; Social Security unemployment
compensation program upheld); and De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (8-0 decision)
(free speech; clear and present danger rule adopted).
14. The most intimate account of Black's life and thought is H. BLACK, JR., My FA-
THER: A REMEMBRANCE (1975). Justice Black's only major extrajudicial statement of his
views is H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968).
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to fill the empty seat."8 Reed was a moderate New Dealer. Although
not as radical as Justice Black, Reed moved immediately into the
existing liberal bloc, close to Justices Brandeis and Stone.
These two successions alone were enough to break the power of
the conservative wing. During the October 1937 Term, Justice Mc-
Reynolds cast more dissents than all seven liberals and moderates
combined. Justice McReynolds dissented twenty-eight times; Justice
Brandeis, in contrast, dissented once.
The liberals, in short, were in full control by the October 1937
Term. They exercised that control vigorously, issuing landmark deci-
sions in both economic and civil liberties cases. The most famous and
characteristic decision of the Term was probably United States v.
Carolene Products Co." While confirming the new rule of judicial
restraint in socio-economic cases, the Court suggested in a famous
footnote that "more exacting scrutiny" might be appropriate where
the government infringes explicit constitutional liberties, discrimi-
nates against insular minorities, or undercuts the legislative
process.1 7
The swing to the left accelerated in the next few years. The
liberal Justice Cardozo died on July 9, 1938, and Felix Frankfurter,
a close friend of Roosevelt, was chosen to replace him." One of the
nation's foremost liberals and a protege of Justice Brandeis, Frank-
furter promptly joined the Court's liberal wing. He disagreed with
Justice Black in only one of the sixty-five cases in which both partic-
ipated during Frankfurter's first Term.
On February 13, 1939, the liberal Justice Brandeis resigned.
He was replaced by William 0. Douglas, another of Roosevelt's in-
ner circle of advisors and friends." Douglas, arguably the most lib-
eral Justice in the entire history of the Supreme Court, had been
15. For a brief biographical account concerning Reed, see 3 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL,
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1969, at 2373-89 (1969).
16. 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (6-1 decision) (substantive due process).
17. Id. at 152 n.4. Other landmark cases decided during the Term included Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (6-2 decision) (criminal procedure; sixth amendment right of
indigent defendant to appointed counsel); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (6-2
decision) (civil procedure; diversity jurisdiction); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (8-0
decision) (free speech; handbills); and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (8-1 deci-
sion) (criminal procedure; due process).
18. Among the many works on Frankfurter, the following are especially interesting: B.
MURPHY, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES (H. Phillips ed. 1960); B. MURPHY, THE
BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982).
19. Douglas' life is described in detail in his two-volume autobiography: W. DOUGLAS,
Go EAST, YOUNG MAN (1974) and W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975 (1980).
See also J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (1980).
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chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission and was a leader
in the New Deal efforts to regulate private enterprise. Like Justice
Frankfurter, Douglas moved squarely into the Court's liberal wing
during his first Term,2" as the following table shows.
TABLE 2
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1938 TERM
DOUGLAS BLACK FRANKFURTER BUTLER McREYNOLDS
LIBERAL
Douglas --- 0.0% 0.0% 58.8% 64.7%
Black 
--- 1.5% 32.1% 34.5%
Frankfurter --- 29.7% 31.3%
CONSERVATIVE
Butler 
--- 2.2%
McReynolds I I
Voting data for Justices Frankfurter's and Douglas' first Term
show a liberal rout. justice Brandeis, for example, did not cast a
single dissent in his last sixty-five cases. In contrast, McReynolds
and Butler cast sixty-six dissenting votes, accounting for more than
sixty percent of all dissents during the Term. Once again the liberals
dominated in cases involving both economics2 1 and civil liberties. 2 In
response to the Court's growing liberalism, Roberts and Hughes, the
swing votes in the constitutional revolution of 1937, shifted back to-
ward the conservative pole.
In the October 1939 Term the shift to the left continued. On
November 16, 1939, the conservative Justice Butler died leaving Mc-
Reynolds as the only remaining member of the once dominant four
horsemen. On February 5, 1940, Frank Murphy was seated to re-
place Butler." Murphy, former governor of Michigan and
Roosevelt's attorney general, was one of the most liberal Justices
ever to sit on the Court. Murphy's arrival brought the number of
Roosevelt appointees to five, an absolute majority.
The most notable patterns revealed by the voting data for the
period after Murphy's seating are the cohesion and dominance of the
20. Douglas participated in only 18 cases during the Term.
21. E.g., Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) (6-2 decision) (federal commerce
power); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (6-2 decision) (intergovern-
mental tax immunity).
22. E.g., Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (5-2 decision) (free speech and assem-
bly); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (6-2 decision) (race; segregated
schools).
23. See 4 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-
1969, at 2493-506 (1969).
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Roosevelt bloc. In 133 of the 137 cases decided during the October
1939 Term, for example, the Roosevelt appointees banded together
on the winning side. Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy did not
disagree a single time during the Term.
The Roosevelt bloc dominated the Court."' Dissent rates went
down on the left and up on the right. McReynolds' dissent rate con-
tinued its steady climb, reaching the highest level (26.7%) of any
Justice since the January 1838 Term. The three most conservative
Justices cast eighty-two percent of the dissents during the October
1939 Term, and McReynolds cast twice as many dissents as the six
most liberal Justices combined!
In the October 1940 Term the fortunes of the conservative wing
fell to a new low when Justice McReynolds, the last of the four
horsemen, resigned on January 1, 1941 .25 That left Justice Roberts,
the Court's former swing vote, on the far right. In response to the
Court's growing liberalism, Justices Roberts, Hughes, Stone, and
Reed shifted to the right. Roberts and Hughes, the two most con-
servative Justices after McReynolds' retirement, dissented more than
all six liberals combined. The Roosevelt appointees voted as a bloc in
150 of the 165 cases decided during the Term, and their combined
five votes controlled the outcome. In short, the liberals ruled the
roost .
The October 1940 Term marked the end of the Roosevelt
Court's first period. Perhaps the most striking voting pattern during
the early years of the Roosevelt Court was the astonishing cohesion
of the Roosevelt appointees. Black and Douglas, for example, agreed
in 335 cases before recording their first disagreement! They agreed
in every case during the first three Terms they were both on the
Court. Of course, "Black and Douglas, the Damon and Pythias of
the Court, 27 are famous for their liberal partnership. It is perhaps
even more surprising that Justices Black and Frankfurter, the lead-
24. Landmark liberal victories during the October 1939 Term included: Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (6-3 decision) (labor; antitrust exemption); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (9-0 decision) (freedom of religion); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940) (8-1 decision) (free speech; labor picketing); and Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) (7-1 decision) (free speech; access to public forum).
25. McReynolds was not replaced until the following Term.
26. The number of major liberal landmarks declined during the October 1940 Term,
perhaps because of the onrush of World War I. The most famous decision of the Term, no
doubt was United States v. F.W. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (8-0 decision)
(federal commerce power; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 upheld). This case was "a verita-
ble graveyard for the leading economic ideas of the pre-1937 Court." R. GALLOWAY, THE
RICH AND THE POOR IN SUPREME COURT HISTORY 147 (1983).
27. C. PRITCHETT, supra note 10, at 39.
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ers of the Court's competing wings in the 1950's, agreed in 199 of
the first 202 cases in which both participated. And Roosevelt's two
other appointees, Reed and Murphy, were also closely aligned with
Justices Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter. The following table shows
the amazingly close agreement among the Roosevelt appointees dur-
ing their early years.
TABLE 3
AGREEMENT RATES AMONG THE ROOSEVELT APPOINTEES-
OCTOBER 1937, 1938 & 1939 TERMS
MURPHY BLACK DOUGLAS FRANK- REED
FURTER
MURPHY 100% 100% 98.2% 96.5%
57/57 56/56 56/57 55/57
BLACK 100% 98.5% 94.5%
154/154 199/202 291/308
DOUGLAS 98.7% 95.9%
152/154 140/146
FRANKFURTER 97.4%
188/193
REED
The liberals dominated throughout the early years of the
Roosevelt Court. This liberal dominance emerged in March 1937
and became increasingly secure as the years passed. By the October
1940 Term, the Court had the 6-1-2 liberal majority shown in the
following table.
TABLE 4
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1940 TERM
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Douglas Hughes -* McReynolds
Black Roberts
Murphy
Frankfurter
Reed
Stone
19841
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2. The Roosevelt Court's Second Period: The Liberals Divide
(1941-46)
During the October 1941 Term, a new voting pattern emerged
on the Roosevelt Court: the Roosevelt appointees split into a liberal,
activist bloc and a moderate, restrained bloc."8 This pattern would
characterize the next few years and have effects lasting through the
1950's and into the 1960's. As the years passed, these two
blocs-often called the Black and Frankfurter blocs respec-
tively-increasingly battled each other for control of the Court, trad-
ing wins and losses for roughly two decades.
In the early years of the Roosevelt Court, Justice Frankfurter
had tended to dominate the liberal bloc. An apostle of judicial re-
straint in the Holmes-Brandeis-Stone tradition, Frankfurter believed
that judicial activism is wrong whether on behalf of conservative or
of liberal causes. After a few years under Frankfurter's influence,
Justices Black and Douglas, charter members of the activist bloc,
began to call for a more aggressive posture, especially in dealing
with constitutionally protected civil liberties. 9 Murphy later joined
the activist group, after a year or so under Frankfurter's spell. Reed,
meanwhile, lined up with Frankfurter as an advocate of moderation
and restraint.
Three personnel changes occurred on the first day of the Octo-
ber 1941 Term that accelerated the rupture of the Roosevelt bloc.
First, Harlan Fiske Stone was promoted to Chief Justice, succeeding
Hughes, who had resigned effective July 1, 1941. Stone, a giant in
Supreme Court history, was by consensus an ineffective Chief Jus-
tice who allowed intra-Court debates to degenerate into personal
squabbles."0
Second, Robert H. Jackson, Roosevelt's brilliant and sharp-
tongued Attorney General, was appointed to the Associate Justice
position vacated by Stone.81 Jackson lined up with the Frankfurter
28. Cf C. PRITCHETT, supra note 10, at 39-40. "Some startling changes in judicial
divisions occurred [during the October 1941 Term] . . . , and the Court began to give the
appearance of flying apart in all directions. Looking backward, it is clear that the 1941-42
Term was definitely a turning point for the Roosevelt Court. With seven New Deal appointees
this group may have felt a certain sense of relief from the previous constraint of being only a
bare majority, or less than a majority, of the Court. The battle being won, they broke ranks."
29. The split between Douglas and Frankfurter was accompanied by intense personal
hostility, especially on Frankfurter's part. See B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIs/FRANKFURTER
CONNECTION 261-68 (1982).
30. See A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956).
31. For first-hand accounts of Jackson's views, see R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (1954); R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JU-
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bloc, adding his fiery personality to the anti-activist forces."2
Third, James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt's close friend and advisor,
succeeded McReynolds, raising the number of Roosevelt appointees
to seven. 3 With seven votes out of nine, the Roosevelt appointees no
longer needed to preserve a solid front to control the Court, so attitu-
dinal differences that had previously been latent came to the fore.
The emerging rift among the Roosevelt appointees is plainly
visible in the voting statistics for the October 1941 Term. Frank-
furter, for example, parted company with his former close allies,
Douglas, Black, and Murphy, as the following table shows.
TABLE 5
FRANKFURTER'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1939 & 1941 TERMS
OCT. 1939 OCT. 1941
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
DOUGLAS 1.5% 25.5% +24.0%
BLACK 1.5% 23.8% +22.3%
MURPHY 1.8% 18.8% +17.0%
Justice Reed also moved away from the liberal activists and toward
the center of the Court. Jackson and Byrnes lined up between Reed
and Frankfurter, very near the center of the Court.
In short, the October 1941 Term saw Roosevelt's appointees
split into an activist bloc which included Justices Black, Douglas,
and Murphy, and a restrained bloc which included Justices Frank-
furter, Jackson, Byrnes, and Reed. Stone, meanwhile, crossed over
into the Court's conservative wing, taking the position next to Rob-
erts, who now had sole possession of the right extreme.
Neither wing was dominant during the October 1941 Term.
The emergence of the five-vote "restrained" faction pushed the lib-
eral activists into writing more dissents. In fact, for the first time
since the constitutional revolution of 1937, dissent rates were higher
on the left than on the right. But the margin was very thin. On the
average, the blocks traded wins and losses rather equally. 4
DICIAL SUPREMACY (1940).
32. As Jackson described his position on the Court, "In general, I agreed with Chief
Justice Stone that activism was no more appropriate on the part of the judiciary in favor of
reforms than it was in knocking them down." L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at
2565. Over the years, Jackson developed an intense animosity toward Black.
33. For abrief account of Byrnes's career, see L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note
23, at 2517-34.
34. The most famous decisions of the Term included wins for both blocs. Conservative
1984]
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In the October 1942 Term, the liberal-activist bloc was
strengthened by the arrival of Wiley B. Rutledge to replace Justice
Byrnes, who resigned after one Term to return to a position in the
wartime executive branch.3 5 "[An outspoken defender of the under-
dog,"" Rutledge immediately lined up with Justices Black, Douglas,
and Murphy, bringing the activist wing to within one vote of major-
ity status. Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge soon earned the
nickname, the "libertarian four," because of their battle on behalf of
individual liberties.
The Rutledge appointment completed the long string of person-
nel changes during the Roosevelt presidency. These changes, which
are summarized in the following table, brought the Supreme Court
to the most liberal posture in its entire history to that time.
TABLE 6
THE ROOSEVELT APPOINTMENTS
Van Devanter )o Black
Sutherland lo Reed
Cardozo l Frankfurter
Brandeis 0-- Douglas
Butler -Murphy
Hughes 3 Jackson
McReynolds - Byrnes 0 Rutledge
Voting data for the October 1942 Term show increased polari-
zation on the Court. The libertarian four held down the Court's left
wing. Frankfurter continued his sharp shift away from the liberal
activists. Justices Jackson, Reed and Stone lined up in Frankfurter's
moderate bloc, leaving Roberts to hold down the far right. The
Court was more polarized than it had been in years, but neither bloc
was dominant. Dissent rates on the left and right were again almost
equal, with a slight margin in favor of the moderates."7
victories included Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (5-4 decision) (free speech; sale of
literature on public street), and Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (6-3 decision) (criminal
procedure; right to counsel). Liberal activism prevailed in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (9-0 decision) (right not to be sterilized); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (5-
4 decision) (criminal procedure; contempt); and Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941)
(9-0 decision) (ban on immigration of indigents into state rejected).
35. See F. HARPER, JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND THE BRIGHT CONSTELLATION (1965).
36. L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 2595.
37. In spite of the even balance of power, the Term had a definitely liberal flavor.
Important liberal decisions included Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (5-3
decision) (denaturalization); West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (6-3 decision) (free speech; compulsory pledge of allegiance); United States ex rel. TVA
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The following table shows the 4-4-1 lineup that emerged after
the seating of Rutledge in the October 1942 Term. This lineup pre-
vailed until the end of the October 1944 Term.
TABLE 7
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1942 TERM
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Murphy Frankfurter -o Roberts
Black Stone
Douglas Reed
Rutledge Jackson
During the October 1943 and 1944 Terms, the Roosevelt Court
continued to split along the same political lines. As the battle heated
up, Justice Frankfurter moved farther away from his former liberal
colleagues.38
TABLE 8
FRANKFURTER'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1939-43 TERMS
USTICE OCT. 1939 OCT. 1940 OCT. 1941 OCT. 1942 OCT. 1943
DOUGLAS 1.5% 8.1% 25.5% 26.2% 31.8%
BLACK 1.5% 8.0% 23.8% 29.2% 29.1%
MURPHY 1.8% 3.9% 18.8% 29.5% 33.1%
The libertarian four-Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rut-
ledge-continued to make up the left wing. Jackson, Reed, and
Stone joined Frankfurter in the center of the Court. All four moder-
ates leaned toward the conservative pole, where Justice Roberts op-
erated, often in splendid isolation.
Dissent and disagreement rates leaped to modern record levels
v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943) (5-4 decision) (eminent domain); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (5-4 decision) (free speech; door-to-door solicitation); Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (5-4 decision) (free speech; tax on distribution of reli-
gious literature); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (7-1 decision) (criminal pro-
cedure; federal supervisory power); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (8-0 decision)
(federal commerce power).
There were also many conservative decisions, some of which were important. E.g. Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (9-0 decision) (Japanese curfew); Helvering v.
Grifliths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943) (5-3 decision) (tax); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,
317 U.S. 269 (1943) (5-3 decision) (criminal procedure; waiver of jury trial).
38. Frankfurter had the second most conservative voting record on the Court during the
October 1942 and 1943 Terms.
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reflecting the intense ideological and personal conflicts on the Court.
Average dissents per case jumped from 1.25 in the October 1942
Term, a modern record, to 1.47 the next Term, and to 1.59 in 1944,
which was nearly triple the average at the start of the Roosevelt era.
Meanwhile, disagreement rates between the blocs leaped spectacu-
larly. During the October 1943 Term, the first disagreement rates
above forty percent were recorded in more than a century. In the
October 1944 Term, Black and Roberts disagreed in 83 of the 151
decisions in which both participated! Their fifty-five percent disa-
greement rate was the highest of any since the August 1793 Term.
During this period, the liberal and "less liberal" wings contin-
ued to trade wins and losses rather evenly. No single bloc of Justices
was dominant. The generally liberal character of the Court becomes
clear, however, when one considers that Roberts, the Court's most
conservative member, dissented nearly twice as often as any other
Justice. In fact, Roberts' dissent rate broke the modern Court record
two years in a row-30.2% for the October 1943 Term, and 35.9%
for the October 1944 Term.
The outer limit of the Roosevelt Court's statistical swing to the
left occurred in the October 1944 Term, when the average dissent
rate of the three most conservative Justices was fifty percent above
that of the three most liberal Justices.
TABLE 9
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1944 TERM
.JUSTICE DISSENTS DISSENT RATE
LIBERAL
Black 28 18.2%
Douglas 23 15.4%
Rutledge 23 14.7%
Average 24.7 16.1%
CONSERVATIVE
Frankfurter 25 16.2%
Stone 32 20.8%
Roberts 55 35.9%
Average 37.3 24.3%
On the other hand, the lowest dissent rates on the Court be-
longed to the moderate Justices, Jackson and Reed, indicating a lack
of dominance by the libertarian four. Moreover, the flow of innova-
tive landmark decisions seems to have eased as the 1940's progressed;
[Vol. 24
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the judicial restraint that typifies wartime was clearly in effect.' 9
The October 1945 Term was a transition Term, setting the
stage for the ensuing Vinson era (1946-53). First, Roberts resigned
effective July 31, 1945. In an unusual bipartisan gesture, Truman
appointed Harold H. Burton, a Republican, to succeed Roberts.' 0 As
expected, Burton promptly lined up with the Court's less liberal
wing. Second, Chief Justice Stone died on April 22, 1946. Stone fin-
ished off his great career in the Court's right wing, closest to Reed
and Burton and farthest from Douglas and Rutledge.
In general, the voting patterns for the October 1945 Term, last
of the Roosevelt Court, were nebulous. Roberts' departure elimi-
nated the last of the pre-Roosevelt conservative wing. The Court's
new "right" wing was occupied by such liberals and moderates as
Justices Stone, Frankfurter, and Reed. For the time being, this was
a Court without conservatives. With the war over, the liberals ap-
parently felt the time was ripe to make some new law, and the Court
responded with a final outburst of liberal-activist decisions which
marked the end of its "Roosevelt era.' 41
During its 1937-46 Roosevelt era, the Supreme Court initiated
fundamental changes in American law. The Roosevelt Court was
much more liberal than its predecessors. Its liberalism was especially
evident in economic cases and civil liberties cases.
In cases involving essentially economic interests, the Roosevelt
Court carried out its most famous constitutional revolution, rejecting
the conservative activism that had dominated since the 1890's. The
Court no longer declared economic reform legislation unconstitu-
tional and instead adopted the deferential stance long advocated by
liberal Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo. The doctrine
of substantive due process in economic cases and the related doctrine
of liberty of contract were almost eliminated.4 The commerce clause
39. Indeed, the most noted cases of the period were the infamous Japanese relocation
cases, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (6-3 decision) (exclusions from West
Coast); and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (9-0 decision) (curfew). A few
minor liberal landmarks were decided, but they were not very far-reaching. E.g., Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (5-4 decision) (free speech; "preferred position"); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (5-4 decision) (conspiracy to violate civil rights); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (8-1 decision) (race; "white primaries").
40. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 2617-27, for an account of Bur-
ton's career.
41. E.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (8-1 decision) (race; segregated com-
mon carriers); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (9-0 decision) (free speech/fair
trial); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (6-3 decision) (free speech).
42. E.g., State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313
U.S. 236 (1941); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power
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was invested once again with the broad scope that Chief Justice
Marshall had established more than a century earlier.' 3 Similarly,
the Court broadly interpreted other federal powers.44 The Court re-
jected the notion that the tenth amendment restricts the federal gov-
ernment by reserving large areas for exclusive state control."5 It also
discarded the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.' 6
The Court's deferential attitude toward economic legislation
was applied not only to the federal government, but to the States as
well. The elimination of the substantive due process/liberty of con-
tract doctrine freed the States from far-reaching restraints" as did
the softening of dormant commerce clause restrictions.' 8 In short, the
Roosevelt Court withdrew from the role of constitutional censor of
socio-economic legislation and instead adopted the posture of judicial
restraint characteristic of Holmes/Brandeis liberalism.
But the economic liberalism of the Roosevelt Court went far
beyond the bare bones of the constitutional revolution of 1937. Even
though the Court would no longer declare socio-economic reform
legislation unconstitutional, there still remained the vastly important
task of construing and enforcing the sweeping statutes characteristic
of the New Deal Era of big government. Here the Roosevelt Court
liberally construed these statutes. Again and again the Court insisted
upon vigorous enforcement of reform legislation. This position was
perhaps most evident in labor cases,' 9 leading Corwin to conclude in
1941, "Constitutional law has always a central interest to guard.
Today it appears to be that of organized labor.""0 The Court gener-
ally gave vigorous support to legislative and executive programs of
Co., 307 U.S. 104 (1939); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
43. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. F.W. Darby Lum-
ber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
44. E.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (taxing and spending power); Stew-
ard Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (taxing and spending power).
45. E.g., United States v. F.W. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
46. E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); H.P. Hood & Sons v. United
States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939).
47. See cases cited supra note 42.
48. E.g., Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); McGoldrick v. Ber-
wind-White Coal Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940); South Carolina Highway Dept.. v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938).
49. E.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
50. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY viii (8th ed.
1946).
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business and trade regulation. 1
The Roosevelt Court also adopted a liberal posture in civil lib-
erties cases. In this area, the Court rejected the hands-off approach
that characterized its economic cases. Adopting an explicit double
standard,52 the Court took an activist role in civil liberties cases, em-
ploying aggressive judicial review to nullify governmental action
which did not conform to its libertarian policies.
The libertarian posture of the Roosevelt Court was perhaps
most evident in first amendment cases. By the early 1940's, the doc-
trine that first amendment freedoms have a "preferred position" in
our constitutional system had obtained majority support." In a series
of famous cases, the Court reinforced the freedoms of speech, press,
and religion. The Jehovah's Witnesses won a number of victories,
overthrowing the compulsory flag salute, 4 license taxes for the dis-
tribution of religious literature," bans on the distribution of hand-
bills, 6 bans on the distribution of literature in company towns,57 and
other similar restrictions." The Court reinforced freedom of the
press by increasing the protection for published comments on judicial
proceedings 9 and by restricting the power of the Post Office Depart-
ment to censor publications by denying second-class mailing privi-
leges.60 The Court also protected the first amendment rights of un-
51. E.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (FPC); NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (FCC); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942)
(FPC); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (USDA). See PRITCHETT, supra note
10, at 167-97, which discusses "[tihe generally favorable attitude of the Roosevelt Court to-
ward administrative legislation." Id. at 168.
52. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
53. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
54. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Mi-
nersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1948).
55. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), overruling Jones v. Opelika, 316
U.S. 584 (1942).
56. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
57. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
58. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (first case incorporating first
amendment freedom of religion into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (seminal case on access to public forum).
59. E.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (no contempt unless publication creates
clear and present danger of obstruction of justice); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946)
(no contempt unless publication creates clear and present danger of obstruction of justice);
Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (no summary contempt for newspa-
per comments on pending litigation).
60. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
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popular radical groups against government suppression."
With several noteworthy exceptions such as the Japanese relo-
cation cases, 3 the Roosevelt Court played an important role in the
maintenance of civil liberties during World War II. The Court re-
jected efforts to punish individuals for issuing publications protected
by the first amendment. 8 It insisted upon full compliance with the
restrictions of the treason clause. 64 It overturned convictions for con-
spiracy to resist the draft based on insufficient evidence,"' and pro-
hibited denaturalization in the absence of "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence."" On this basis, Pritchett concluded in 1948:
The strong bias of the Roosevelt Court toward the maintenance
of civil liberties was responsible to a large degree for the serious
and on the whole successful effort made to prevent the develop-
ment of intolerance and witch-hunts during World War II on
the scale which had marred American participation in the pre-
ceding war.67
The Roosevelt Court also engaged in some libertarian activism
in race discrimination cases. The Court invalidated the white pri-
mary system, which had denied effective voting rights to black per-
sons.68 It took the first steps toward the eradication of segregation,
using the dormant commerce clause to nullify a state statute requir-
ing segregated seating on public motor carriers."8 It reversed convic-
tions when black persons had been excluded from grand and petit
juries,"° and resurrected two provisions of the Reconstruction Era
Civil Rights Acts." On the whole, however, the efforts of the
Roosevelt Court to resist the blight of racial discrimination were
weak and ineffective.
61. E.g., United States v. Lovett 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (bill of attainder); Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (deportation).
62. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (evacuation); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (curfew); but see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944)
(detention).
63. Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
64. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
65. Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945).
66. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
67. C. PRITCHxrr, supra note 10, at 117.
68. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
69. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
70. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); but see Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) (intentional
limit to one black on grand jury upheld).
71. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
(1941).
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The record of the Roosevelt Court in criminal procedure cases
was mixed. In cases involving the application of the Bill of Rights to
federal criminal trials, the Court showed some characteristic liberal
activism.72 Similarly, the Court made occasional reforms by using its
supervisory power over federal criminal procedure.7 Moreover, the
Court put some bite into the due process requirement that state
criminal prosecutions comply with standards of fundamental fair-
ness. 7  On the other hand, the Court rejected the contention voiced
by Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge that the four-
teenth amendment makes the Bill of Rights applicable to the States
and declined to engage in the liberal-activist criminal procedure
revolution later carried out by the Warren Court.7
To summarize, the Roosevelt Court began in March, 1937 in
response to Roosevelt's Court-packing scheme. From that time
through the end of the October 1945 Term, the Court was domi-
nated by relatively liberal Justices. As conservatives were replaced
by liberal and moderate New Dealers, the Court became more lib-
eral than at any other time in its prior history. Once the Roosevelt
appointees gained control of the Court, they split into two wings,
with the liberal activists and the more moderate advocates of judicial
restraint vying for control. By the October 1942 Term, the Court
had four liberal activists, four moderates, and only one conservative.
The Court's liberalism was evident across a broad spectrum of cases
involving socio-economic issues, first amendment rights, war-time
civil liberties, racial discrimination, and criminal procedure.
B. The Vinson Court (1946-53)7'
1. The Vinson Court's Early Years: Polarization (1946-49)
When the 1946 Term opened on October 7, 1946, a new Chief
72. "The Roosevelt Court is clearly a Bill of Rights court .... The values enshrined in
these provisions are closely related to the freedoms of the First Amendment, and the RooseveltCourt has to a considerable degree exhibited the same kind of concern for protection of theprocedural rights of defendants in criminal cases that it has shown for the protection of civil
liberties." C. PRtTCHErr, supra note 10, at 137. On the other hand, restrictive interpretations
were also adopted in a number of cases.
73. E.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
74. E.g., Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) (right to counsel); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1943) (coerced confession); but cf. Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947) (right
to counsel).
75. E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
76. For a detailed discussion of substantive developments and voting patterns during theVinson era, see C. PRiTCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT (1954). See also
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Justice, Fred M. Vinson of Kentucky, occupied the central chair. 7
Vinson, Truman's close friend and political advisor, succeeded
Harlan Fiske Stone, who had died in April 1946. The remaining
eight Justices had been split 4-4 during the latter part of the divisive
Stone era. The libertarian four, Rutledge, Murphy, Black, and
Douglas, remained on the left. The more conservative proponents of
judicial restraint, Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, and Reed were on
the right. Given the 4-4 split on the Court, Vinson moved into a
position of great power at the start of his tenure.
The alignment that emerged in the October 1946 Term and
prevailed until the end of the October 1948 Term was as follows:
TABLE 10
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES -
OCTOBER 1946 THROUGH 1948 TERMS
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE 78
Murphy Jackson
Rutledge Frankfurter
Black -*-Burton
Douglas -4-Vinson
--kReed
A frequently noted irony of Supreme Court history is that the
relatively liberal President Harry S. Truman moved the Court to the
right by appointing four rather conservative Justices, while the more
conservative President Dwight D. Eisenhower moved the Court to
the left with his liberal appointments. The conservative effect of
Truman's appointments was already evident during the October
Galloway, The Vinson Court: Polarization (1946-1949) and Conservative Dominance
(1949-1953), 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375 (1982).
77. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 2639-49 for a description of
Vinson's career.
78. By the 1946 Term, all the pre-1937 conservatives were gone, and the moderates of
the Roosevelt era had become the Court's new conservative wing. Use of the label "conserva-
tive" to describe the Vinson-Frankfurter wing is perhaps somewhat misleading. The Vinson
Court's right wing was much more liberal than the conservatives who sat on the Court during
earlier periods. In fact, all members of the Vinson Court were relatively liberal in economic
cases. For this reason, contemporary commentators often used the labels "liberal-activist" and
"liberal-restrained" to characterize the Vinson Court's left and right wings. E.g., C. PRITCH-
ETT, supra note 76, at 182-226. In retrospect, it appears that the Vinson-Frankfurter wing
was generally more conservative than the libertarian four, so the labels "liberal" and "con-
servative" will be used here. But the reader should not equate the Vinson Court's brand of
conservatism with that of the four horsemen and other pre-1937 conservatives.
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1946 Term, which was marked by a sharp turn to the right in the
Court's voting patterns.79
The cases which best illustrated the Vinson Court's conserva-
tism during the October 1946 Term are United Public Workers v.
Mitchell,8 ° United States v. United Mine Workers,8" and Adamson
v. California.8" These cases suggested a willingness to pull back
79. The shift to the right was noted by one important commentator as early as 1948.
The Court's two post-Roosevelt appointees, Burton and Vinson, stand at the
bottom of the table [on civil rights votes]. While they have not participated in a
large number of cases, it is obvious that the net effect of their substitution for
Roberts and Stone has been to shift the balance of the Court to the right on civil
liberties matters, so that in an increasing number of instances Black, Douglas,
Murphy, and Rutledge find it impossible to pick up the one additional Justice
necessary to maintain the activist attitude toward judicial protection of civil lib-
erties generally characteristic of the Roosevelt Court.
C. PRITCHETT, supra note 10, at 132.
The shift to the right, that began during Chief Justice Vinson's first Term and acceler-
ated after the summer of 1949, reflected a general shift to the right in the nation. The most
significant factor in the hardening of conservative attitudes in the late 1940's was undoubtedly
the start of the Cold War. After Churchill's Iron Curtain speech in 1946, the nation entered
an era in which fears of world-wide Communism reached panic proportions. The emergence of
the House Un-American Activities Committee and the initiation of the federal loyalty-security
program in the late 1940's were the forerunners of the McCarthy hysteria, which reached full
force in the 1950-53 period. Along with the witch hunts came a shift to the right in other
areas. Anti-labor sentiment gained ground, producing, most notably, the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947. President Truman's Fair Deal package of reform legislation died in Congress. In all, the
mood of the nation was cautious and conservative.
80. 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (4-3 decision) (free speech; Hatch Act). This case upheld the
constitutionality of the Hatch Act's restrictions on political activity by federal civil service
employees.
81. 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (5-4 decision) (labor). In United Mine Workers, the Court
upheld sanctions against John L. Lewis and the UMW for conduct during the bituminous coal
strike of 1946. In the years prior to 1947, the Court had been strongly pro-labor. United Mine
Workers indicated that the era of special judicial protection for labor was drawing to an end.
Even Douglas and Black deserted the union on several major issues, leaving Murphy and
Rutledge alone on the left. As early as 1948, United Mine Workers was recognized as both a
turning point and as an indicator that the liberal Roosevelt Court had given way to a more
conservative Vinson Court. "[A]lready the temper of the Court is changing, and a swing to the
right is apparent in several fields . . . . At the moment my own guess is that the Roosevelt
Court came to an end on that Thursday in March, 1947, when the John L. Lewis decision
was handed down." C. PRITCHETT, supra note 10, at xiv.
82. 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure). Adamson involved a full-
scale debate between the conservatives and liberals concerning the Court's role in state criminal
cases. The four liberal activists contended in their dissenting opinions that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment was intended to make all of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights applicable to the States. If a fifth vote had been present, Adamson would now be
viewed as the start of a major criminal procedure revolution. The five conservatives, however,
held their majority together and rejected the incorporation theory, finding that the due process
clause was intended only to ban state procedures which deny "fundamental fairness." As a
result, the victory of the incorporation theory and the start of the criminal procedure revolution
were delayed for another 15 years until the early 1960's.
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from the liberal activism characteristic of the Roosevelt Court on
first amendment, labor, and criminal procedure issues.88
Nevertheless, the swing to the right in the early years of the
Vinson era did not lead to immediate conservative dominance. The
liberals rallied somewhat in the October 1947 Term and managed to
retain approximate parity with Jackson and Frankfurter through the
end of the October 1948 Term, as the following table shows:
TABLE 11
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1946 THROUGH 1948 TERMS
DISSENT
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATE
LIBERAL
Douglas 356 93 26.1%
Rutledge 362 94 25.9%
Murphy 355 81 22.8%
Black 362 78 21.5%
Average 24.1%
CONSERVATIVE
Frankfurter 366 91 24.9%
Jackson 346 87 25.1%
Average 25.0%
The lowest dissent rates on the Court were posted by the moderate-
conservatives, Vinson (13.6%), Reed (14.0%), and Burton (18.6%).84
Commentators have suggested that Truman went outside the
Court for the new Chief Justice in an attempt to avoid further fric-
83. Interesting conservative decisions in bloc-voting cases during the October 1947 and
1948 Terms included Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (6-3 decision) (criminal proce-
dure; search and seizure); UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
245 (1949) (5-4 decision) (labor; free speech); Goessaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (6-3
decision) (equal protection; sex discrimination); Ludicke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (5-4
decision) (war power); United States v. Columbia Steel Corp., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (5-4 deci-
sion) (antitrust); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; as-
sistance of counsel); Bakery Sales Drivers Local 33 v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948) (5-3
decision) (labor).
84. Interesting liberal victories in bloc-voting cases in the October 1947 and 1948 Terms
included Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (5-4 decision) (free speech); United States
ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 (1949) (6-3 decision) (immigration); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (5-4 decision) (free speech; prior restraint); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (6-3 decision) (free speech; vagueness); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332
U.S. 708 (1948) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; right to counsel); Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633 (1948) (6-3 decision) (equal protection; aliens). The most famous liberal decision
was Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (6-0 decision) (race; restrictive covenants), which
signaled a trend toward activism in the race relations area.
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tion on a Court which was rapidly becoming famous for its internal
feuds. Hostility between the libertarian four and the Jackson-Frank-
furter pair had become especially intense, as illustrated by Jackson's
blast at Black from Nuremberg, Germany on June 10, 1946. Vinson
was well known for his skills as a mediator, and Truman may have
hoped these skills would provide the Court a more harmonious
working relationship.
Such hopes, however, did not bear fruit in Justice Vinson's first
three Terms. Disagreement levels continued to rise. In the October
1946 Term, disagreement rates at the Court's extremes climbed past
the forty percent level. In the October 1947 Term, disagreement
rates of nearly fifty percent became common, and Black and Jackson
disagreed in 50 of 100 cases. In the October 1948 Term, three pairs
of Justices posted disagreement rates above fifty percent and Rut-
ledge and Jackson disagreed in 60 of 110 cases." The following ta-
ble shows the very high disagreement rates at the Court's extremes
during the October 1946 through 1948 Terms.
TABLE 12
DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1946 THROUGH 1948 TERMS
FRANKFURTER JACKSON
DOUGLAS 44.3% 46.0%
BLACK 43.1% 45.2%
RUTLEDGE 42.8% 44.1%
MURPHY 38.6% 42.1%
Concurrently, the Justices' dissent rates shot upward spectacu-
larly to record levels. In fact, the Court's all-time record for average
dissents per case was broken during both the October 1947 and 1948
Terms. The following table shows the striking, increase in average
dissent rates during the decade culminating in the October 1948
Term.
85. The disagreement rates between Rutledge and Jackson (54.5%) and Douglas and
Jackson (53.2%) were modern records, surpassing the old record (53.0%) set by Black and
Jackson during October 1944 Term.
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TABLE 13
AVERAGE DISSENTS PER CASE-
OCTOBER 1939 THROUGH 1948 TERMS
TERM AVERAGE DISSENTS PER CASE
Oct. 1939 0.59
Oct. 1940 0.71
Oct. 1941 1.11
Oct. 1942 1.24
Oct. 1943 1.45
Oct. 1944 1.58
Oct. 1945 1.37
Oct. 1946 1.70
Oct. 1947 2.01
Oct. 1948 2.13
Overall, the image that best fits the first period of the Vinson
era is a badly split Court whose five-vote conservative wing and
four-vote liberal wing were locked in sharp combat over control of
the Court. Amid unprecedented outbursts of dissent and disagree-
ment, the blocs traded wins and losses with neither side attaining
dominance.
2. The Vinson Court's Second Period: A Conservative Inter-
lude (1949-53)
During the 1949 recess, the libertarian four were shattered by
three events. First, Frank Murphy died on July 2. Second, Wiley
Rutledge died on September 10. Third, William 0. Douglas was
seriously injured in an avalanche on October 2. Douglas did not par-
ticipate in the first sixty-one decisions issued during the Term. As a
result of these developments, the Court's liberal wing was reduced
from four to one for most of the Term, and control passed to the
conservative wing."'
Moving swiftly, President Truman appointed his Attorney
86. Important conservative victories during the Term included: American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (4-3 decision) (labor; non-communist affidavits);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (5-3 decision) (criminal procedure; search
and seizure); and United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (4-3
decision) (alien admission). In one noteworthy area, race relations, a pattern of liberal activism
was present. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (9-0 deci-
sion); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (9-0 decision); Graham v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949) (7-0 decision).
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General, Tom C. Clark, 87 and his former Senate colleague, Sherman
Minton,88 to succeed Justices Murphy and Rutledge. Clark was
seated on the first day of the October 1949 Term, and Minton was
seated nine days later. In their first Term, Clark and Minton joined
the Vinson bloc, bringing it up to five votes and making it the domi-
nant group on the Court. Clark and Vinson disagreed in only one of
the sixty-nine cases in which both participated during the Term.
Minton and Vinson disagreed in only six of seventy-eight decisions.
Burton and Reed provided the fourth and fifth votes that secured the
Vinson bloc's majority.
The dominance of the Vinson bloc can be inferred from the ex-
ceptionally low dissent rates of its members. During the October
1949 Term, for example, Clark did not cast a single dissent, and
Vinson cast only one dissent in eighty-four cases. The following ta-
ble contrasts the dissent rates of the Truman appointees and Black,
the Court's only liberal during most of the Term.
TABLE 14
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1949 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS DISSENT RATE CHANGE
Vinson 84 1 1.2% -17.4%
Clark 72 0 0.0% ---
Minton 81 5 6.2% ---
Burton 86 8 9.3% -9.1%
Black 86 29 33.7% + 12.6%
Black cast twice as many dissents as all four Truman appointees
combined.
The four Justices who were not members of the Vinson bloc
were split into two pairs. On the left were Douglas and Black. In
response to the new conservative dominance, Black's dissent rate
jumped to 33.7%, by far his highest one-Term dissent rate since he
joined the Court in 1937.89 On the right were Justices Jackson and
87. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 2665-77. "Clark's personality and
point of view resembled Vinson's." Id. at 2667. "As expected, Clark strengthened Vinson's
position." Id. at 2668. Later, influenced by Earl Warren, Clark became more moderate.
88. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 2699-2709. Minton was consid-
ered a liberal at the time of his appointment. However, "[riather than join the liberal bloc, he
helped to strengthen the hand of Chief Justice Fred Vinson and to create a five-man conserva-
tive bloc . I..." Id. at 2703. "Minton helped to destroy the liberal bloc's influence on civil
liberties decisions .... No member of the Court during Vinson's seven years as Chief Justice
had a less liberal record in this area." Id.
89. It was also the second highest one-Term dissent rate since 1798. Only Roberts'
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Frankfurter. They disagreed with Douglas and Black substantially
more than the Truman appointees did.
In general, the voting trends initiated during the October 1949
Term continued during the October 1950 Term. The five-vote Vin-
son bloc dominated the Court. Frankfurter and Jackson also held
down positions in the right wing, reinforcing the conservative domi-
nance that characterized the Term." The liberal wing had only two
members, Justices Douglas and Black. The 7-2 conservative majority
characteristic of the period is shown in the following table.
TABLE 15
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1949-51 TERMS
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Douglas Jackson }
Black Frankfurter
ClarkMinton
Vinson
Burton
Reed 1
In response to the continuing conservative dominance, the dis-
sent rates of the liberal Justices during the October 1950 Term shot
up to the highest levels since 1798. Each Justice dissented thirty-five
times in ninety cases, achieving 38.9% dissent rates that were well
above previous modern records. In fact, Douglas and Black together
cast as many dissents as both the entire Vinson bloc and Jackson.
The October 1951 Term marked the third consecutive Term of
the conservative dominance that typified the second period of the
Vinson era.95 Once again, the Vinson bloc controlled the Court in
34.6% dissent rate during the October 1944 Term was higher.
90. The most famous conservative victory was, no doubt, Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951) (6-2 decision) (Smith Act convictions of eleven top Communist Party officers
affirmed). Other illustrative conservative victories included: Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951) (5-4 decision) (loyalty oath); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951) (6-3 decision) (free speech; door-to-door solicitation); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (6-3 decision) (dormant commerce clause); and Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (6-3 decision) (free speech).
Important liberal victories were far fewer than the conservative victories. The most fa-
mous was Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (5-3 decision)
(due process; subversive organizations list).
91. Conservative victories included: On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (5-4
decision) (criminal procedure; electronic interception of oral communications); NLRB v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (6-3 decision) (labor); Stroble v. California, 343
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most cases. The balance of power can be illustrated by comparing
the dissent rates of the four Truman appointees with the two liber-
als. On the average, the liberals dissented in nearly forty percent of
the cases. Black's dissent rate of 43.2% was another modern Supreme
Court record and marked the first time since 1798 that a Justice
dissented in more than forty percent of the cases in a single Term. In
contrast, the four Truman appointees dissented infrequently. Their
average dissent rate was less than one-third of the liberals' average
dissent rate.
TABLE 16
DATA CONCERNING DISSENTS - OCTOBER 1951 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENTS DISSENT RATE
LIBERAL
Black 35 43.2%
Douglas 29 35.4%
Average 32.0 39.3%
CONSERVATIVE
Burton 13 15.7%
Clark 1 1.5%
Vinson 12 14.5%
Minton 13 18.6%
Average 9.75 12.8%
Black and Douglas cast sixty-four dissents which was substantially
more than the thirty-nine cast by all four Truman appointees
combined.""
Perhaps the most interesting development revealed by the voting
U.S. 181 (1952) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; right to counsel); Sacher v. United States,
343 U.S. I (1952) (5-3 decision) (criminal procedure; contempt); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580 (1952) (6-2 decision) (deportation); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (5-
4 decision) (aliens); and Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (6-3 decision) (loyalty-
security).
Despite the conservative dominance, a number of liberal decisions were issued during the
Term, among them several unanimous decisions. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) (6-3 decision) (race); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952) (9-0 decision) (free speech); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (8-0 deci-
sion) (criminal procedure; stomach pumping). The most famous case of the Term, Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), drew three dissents from members of the
Vinson bloc.
92. Beginning with Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952), there was a major burst of
liberal dissents. In the 28 cases starting with Brannan, Black cast 19 dissents and Douglas 17.
In the same 28 cases, the four Truman appointees cast a total of 8 dissents. The conservatives
were clearly dominant.
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data from the October 1951 Term was the takeover of the far right
by the Vinson bloc. During each prior Term of the Vinson era, Jus-
tice Frankfurter and Jackson had arguably held down the positions
on the far right, at least in terms of overall voting statistics. This
pattern changed substantially during the October 1951 Term.
Frankfurter, in particular, moved dramatically toward the Black-
Douglas pole. He disagreed with Minton (46.9%) and Vinson
(39.0%) more than with Black (35.5%) and Douglas (36.8%). Jack-
son remained right of center, but he too had a more liberal voting
record than several members of the Vinson bloc.
The shift in the relative positions of the Vinson and Frank-
furter-Jackson blocs reflected the increasing number of political lib-
erties cases coming before the Court. By 1951, the McCarthy era
was in full swing, and the most pressing issues facing the Court in-
volved the government's pursuit of suspected subversives. In these
cases, the "economic conservatives," Frankfurter and Jackson,
tended to sympathize with the liberal viewpoint. The "political con-
servatives" of the Vinson bloc, in contrast, usually sided with the
government in loyalty-security and subversion cases."'
In response to the politically sensitive cases that increasingly oc-
cupied the Court's attention, polarization between the Court's ex-
tremes shot back up nearly to the record set in the October 1948
Term. The average number of dissents per case was 2.02, second
highest in the Court's history up to that Term. Twelve pairs of Jus-
tices had disagreement rates above forty percent, and disagreement
rates of nearly fifty percent were common. Indeed, the disagreement
rate between Justices Black and Reed was 56.8%. This was the
highest one-Term disagreement rate since the 1790's.
The October 1952 Term was the final Term of the Vinson era.
For the fourth consecutive Term, no personnel changes occurred.
The voting data indicate that the conservative dominance which be-
gan in the October 1949 Term prevailed once again.94 The conserva-
93. See G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 96-116 (1965), for a discussion of the
terms "economic conservative" and "political conservative."
94. Given the commitment of the conservative wing to judicial restraint, it is not surpris-
ing that landmark cases were few. Conservative victories included: Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (5-4 decision) (antitrust); Poulos v. New Hamp-
shire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (7-2 decision) (free speech); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (5-4 decision) (detention of alien); and United States v. Kahriger,
345 U.S. 22 (1952) (6-3 decision) (self-incrimination).
Liberal decisions included: Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (6-1 decision) (race;
restrictive covenants); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S' 461 (1953) (8-1 decision) (race; voting);
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (7-0 decision) (legislative investigation); Wieman
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tive dominance can be illustrated by the dramatic imbalance between
the dissent rates on the left and right. On the far left, Douglas's
dissent rate leaped to fifty percent, obliterating the record set by
Black in the prior Term. Douglas dissented in 51 of the 102 deci-
sions in which he participated. Black's dissent rate dropped some-
what, but it was still the fifth highest since 1798. In contrast, the
members of the controlling Vinson bloc had low dissent rates. Clark,
for example, dissented in only six of ninety-four cases.
TABLE 17
DATA ON DISSENTS - OCTOBER 1952 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS DISSENT RATE
LIBERAL
Douglas 102 51 50.0%
Black 101 39 38.6%
Average 45 44.3%
CONSERVATIVE
Reed 101 9 8.9%
Minton 103 14 13.5%
Clark 94 6 6.4%
Burton 102 11 10.8%
Vinson 103 18 17.5%
Average 11.6 11.5%
The most striking statistical pattern was the astonishingly high
disagreement rates between Justice Douglas and the conservatives.
Justices Douglas and Jackson disagreed in 64.4% or fifty-eight out
of ninety cases! This was the first one-Term disagreement rate above
sixty percent since the 1790's,95 and it broke the one-year-old mod-
ern record of 56.8%. The disagreement rate between Douglas and
Clark (57.0%) also broke the record. Six members of the Court's
conservative wing disagreed with Douglas in more than half of the
cases.
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (8-0 decision) (loyalty oath).
95. Douglas and Jackson had a 64.3% disagreement rate in the October 1949 Term.
However, Douglas was absent most of the Term, and the figure is, therefore, based on only
fourteen cases in which both participated.
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TABLE 18
DOUGLAS' DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1952 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE
JUSTICE WITH DOUGLAS
JACKSON ...................... 64.4%
C LARK ...................... 57.0%
BURTON ..................... 55.0%
M INTON ..................... 52.5%
REED ........................ 51.5%
VINSON ....................... 50.5%
In short, the October 1952 Term marked a nadir of the post-
1937 liberal wing. It was still another very strong Term for the con-
servatives, perhaps strongest of all for the Vinson bloc.
In summary, the Vinson era (1946-53) had two distinct periods
with different voting patterns. During the October 1946, 1947, and
1948 Terms, a contest for control of the Court was waged between a
five-vote conservative wing and a four-vote liberal wing. The strug-
gle was often bitter and caused polarization to reach record levels,
but neither side was dominant. A turning point occurred in 1949,
when the liberal bloc was weakened by the deaths of Justices Mur-
phy and Rutledge and a near-fatal injury to Douglas. At that time
control passed to the conservative wing, and the second phase of the
Vinson era began. During the 1949, 1950, 1951, and 1952 Terms,
the Court was dominated by the conservative Vinson bloc with
strong support from Jackson and mixed support from Frankfurter.
The dissent rates of the two liberals rose to the highest levels since
the 1790's in protest against the conservative tide.
Cases decided during the Vinson era reflect the conservative at-
titudes of the controlling Justices. Perhaps the most famous line of
cases involved freedom of speech and association. In general, these
first amendment rights took a severe beating. The ban on prior re-
straints was weakened." The clear and present danger test was
watered down, allowing Communist leaders to be convicted for advo-
cating forcible overthrow of the government even though no showing
96. E.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (7-2 decision) (permits for
public meetings); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (6-3 decision) (ban on
door to door magazine sales); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1949) (4-3
decision) (Hatch Act). "In summary, it would seem that seven years of the Vinson Court left
prior restraint still suspect, but no longer unconstitutional on its face." C. PRITCHETT, sUpra
note 76, at 49.
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of imminent danger was made. 7 Government employees were forced
from their jobs on the basis of associational ties and allegedly dis-
loyal beliefs. 8 Loyalty oaths were imposed on government employees
and labor union officials.99 Associational rights of Communists were
trampled by legislative investigations. 00 Protections for labor picket-
ing eroded. 11 Although some liberal first amendment decisions were
issued,102 the overall record of the Vinson Court in this area was
conservative.
The Court consistently upheld the government's position in citi-
zenship and deportation cases. Suspected subversives were subjected
to extremely egregious treatment in deportation cases.1 03 Aliens were
97. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (6-2 decision) (Smith Act convictions
of first-string Communist Party Leaders affirmed); cf Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951) (6-3 decision) (public speech punished as disorderly conduct); American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (4-3 decision) (Taft-Hartley non-Communist affi-
davit requirement for labor union officers upheld). "Recent doctrinal developments and per-
sonnel changes on the Court have effectively stripped [the clear and present danger test] of the
ideological support supplied it during the 1940's by the preferred-position argument." C.
PRITCHETT, supra note 76, at 78.
98. E.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (6-3 decision) (statute barring
Communists from teaching jobs upheld); Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (4-4 deci-
sion) (discharge of government employee based on undisclosed charges upheld).
99. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (5-4 decision); Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (9-0 decision); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (4-3 decision). But cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952) (9-0 decision) (loyalty oath held unconstitutional).
100. E.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) (5-3 decision); Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (5-3 decision); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950)
(5-2 decision); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) (5-2 decision). But see United
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (7-0 decision) (legislative investigation); Christoffel v.
United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).(5-4 decision) (contempt of Congress). The Vinson Court
achieved "a record of timidity and confusion in dealing with the difficult problems posed by
wholly new assertions of legislative investigatory powers." C. PRITCHETT, supra note 76, at
90.
101. E.g., Building Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (8-0
decision); International Bd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) (5-3 decision);
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (9-0 decision). "[Tihe Thornhill
principle has been confined to its narrowest limits .... IPlicketing ... was quickly stripped of
the constitutional protection tentatively accorded it by the Roosevelt Court." C. PRITCHETT,
supra note 76, at 56.
102. E.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (9-0 decision) (moving
pictures); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (8-1 decision) (public speaking permits);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (9-0 decision) (public speaking permits); Termi-
niello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (5-4 decision) (public speech causing breach of peace);
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (5-4 decision) (sound trucks); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948) (6-3 decision) (vagueness).
103. E.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (6-2 decision); Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (5-4 decision); United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 521 (1950) (4-3 decision); Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) (6-3 decision);
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (5-4 decision).
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excluded from re-entry into the United States with harsh and op-
pressive results.1"4 In general, the Vinson Court refused to provide
meaningful procedural or substantive protections for persons ad-
versely affected." 5
The Vinson Court was also very conservative in criminal proce-
dure cases. Generally, the Court supported the government and re-
jected the efforts of defendants to impose constitutional controls on
criminal prosecutions. Over strong dissents by the liberal activists,
the Court refused to extend the basic protections of the Bill of Rights
to state trials."0 Moreover, the Court was typically very restrained
and conservative in applying due process (fundamental fairness) lim-
its on police and prosecutors.10 Similarly, the Court was usually
conservative in its enforcement of the Bill of Rights against federal
police and prosecutors"'0 and restrained in the exercise of its supervi-
sory power over the federal criminal justice system.' 0 9 Overall, the
Vinson Court tended to erode the constitutional protections of crimi-
nal defendants, especially after 1949.110
In contrast, the Vinson Court was rather liberal in cases involv-
ing government regulation of essentially economic interests. In this
area, the Holmesian doctrine of judicial restraint was dominant. The
104. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (5-4 decision);
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (4-3 decision).
105. See C. PRITCHrTr, supra note 76, at 101-22.
106. The leading case was Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (5-4 decision)
(privilege against self-incrimination); cf Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (6-3 decision)
(fourth amendment; exclusionary rule).
107. E.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) (6-3 decision) (coerced confession);
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952) (6-3 decision) (coerced confession; counsel); Gal-
legos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) (6-2 decision) (coerced confession); Fisher v. Pace, 336
U.S. 155 (1949) (5-4 decision) (summary contempt); Taylor v. Alabama, 335 U.S. 252 (1948)
(4-3 decision) (coerced confession); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (5-4 decision)
(counsel); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) (5-4 decision) (counsel); Carter v. Illinois, 329
U.S. 173 (1946) (5-4 decision) (counsel); cf In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953) (5-4 deci-
sion) (attorney discipline). But see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (8-0 decision)
(stomach pumping).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (6-3 decision) (privilege
against self-incrimination); On Lee v. United States, 340 U.S. 747 (1952) (5-4 decision)
(fourth amendment); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (5-3 decision) (privilege
against self-incrimination); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950) (5-3 decision) (habeas
corpus); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (5-3 decision) (fourth amendment);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (5-4 decision) (fourth amendment). But see Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (6-3 decision) (waiver of right to counsel).
109. No major supervisory power cases were decided between McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
110. See, e.g., C. PRITCHETT, supra note 76, at 146-76. "With the personnel changes of
1949, Jackson's belief that criminals were being given too much protection for the good of
society tended to become the Court's majority view." Id. at 162.
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Court refused to sit as a super-legislature exercising constitutional
censorship over social welfare legislation. Economic substantive due
process was a dead issue .. and substantial support was given to the
administrative agencies charged with regulating the market place."'
On the other hand, labor unions, the special favorites of the earlier
Roosevelt Court, received rough treatment from the Vinson Court.11 3
In one noteworthy area, race relations, the Vinson Court broke
its normal pattern and engaged in aggressive liberal activism. Proba-
bly the most famous development was the use of the equal protec-
tion-state action theory to ban judicial enforcement of restrictive cov-
enants. " 4 There were other important developments as well. New
emphasis was placed on the equality component of the prevailing
"separate but equal" doctrine. 1 5 The court not only overturned ex-
clusion of racial minorities from voting and from juries, 1 ' but ruled
favorably for minorities in other contexts as well.1 " In general, the
Vinson Court established a rather progressive record in race rela-
111. E.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (8-1 decision);
Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949) (9-0 decision); Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (9-0 decision); Lincoln Federal Labor Union
19129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (9-0 decision).
112. E.g., Allstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953) (Department of Labor;
enforcement of Federal Labor Standards Act); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951)
(NLRB); United States v. United States Smelting & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186 (1950) (ICC);
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (SEC).
113. E.g., NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953) (6-3 decision);
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. NLRB, 336 U.S. 301 (1949) (7-2 decision); UAW v. Wis-
consin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (5-4 decision); Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union
33 v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948) (5-4 decision); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947)
(5-4 decision); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (5-4 decision).
114. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (6-1 decision); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (6-0 decision).
115. E.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (9-0 decision);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (9-0 decision); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S.
631 (1948) (9-0 decision).
116. E.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (8-1 decision) (jury discrimination);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (8-1 decision) (voting discrimination); Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282 (1950) (7-1 decision) (jury discrimination). With regard to jury discrimination,
however, Pritchett has noted "a weakening of protective standards in the hands of the Vinson
Court." C. PRITCHETr, supra note 76, at 164. See, e.g., Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565
(1948) (5-4 decision).
117. E.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) (6-3
decision) (equal representation by labor union); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)
(5-4 decision) (racial defamation); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman & Engine-
men, 338 U.S. 232 (1949) (7-0 decision) (equal representation by labor unions); Bob-Lo Ex-
cursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) (7-2 decision) (dormant commerce clause); cf.
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (7-2 decision) (right of aliens to
fishing licenses); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (6-3 decision) (right of aliens to
own land).
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tions cases.' 8
Overall, however, the dominant characteristics of the Vinson
Court were conservatism and restraint. Writing in 1951, John Frank
called the Vinson era the Supreme Court's "passive period.""' 9
Frank also stated that "[T]he affirmative influence of the Court and
the Constitution on American life since 1946 has been very little
. ... [Clompared either with the other contemporaneous institu-
tions of government or with some past Courts, the influence on the
actual conduct of affairs is small."' 20
C. The Warren Court (1953-69)
1. The Warren Court's Early Years: Emergence of Liberal
Activism (1953-57)
The Warren era began on the first day of the October 1953
Term, when Earl Warren was sworn in as Chief Justice.' 2' Warren,
a progressive Republican, was the most liberal Chief Justice in Su-
preme Court history.122 The Vinson-Warren succession pushed the
Court to the left and initiated a four-year period in which liberal-
activism experienced a comeback from its nadir in the later Vinson
years. " 3
A brief word is perhaps in order here to remind the reader
about the historical setting in which the Warren era began. At the
start of the October 1953 Term, the Eisenhower Administration was
in its first year. The predominant concern of the era was the "Com-
munist menace." The Korean War had just concluded, and fourteen
months still remained before the United States Senate was to con-
demn Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. The United States economy
was in the midst of a vast boom that had begun after World War II.
The first Term of the Warren era, however, was actually a con-
tinuation of the conservative interlude that began with the deaths of
118. "All in all, the liberal record of the Vinson Court in racial discrimination cases
stands out in sharp contrast to the generally antilibertarian trend of its decisions in other
fields." Pritchett, supra note 76, at 145.
119. Frank, Court and Constitution: The Passive Period, 4 VAND. L. REV. 400 (1951).
120. Id.
121. Vinson had died suddenly during the recess.
122. For a first-hand account of Warren's life and views, see E. WARREN, THE
MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN (1977). Eisenhower later said he selected Warren because he
thought Warren was middle of the road. Eisenhower was highly displeased by the liberal
activism of his nominee.
123. See Galloway, The Early Years of the Warren Court: Emergence of Judicial Lib-
eralism (1953-1957), 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 609 (1978).
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Justices Murphy and Rutledge in 1949. Warren's voting record was
moderately conservative in his first year, so the seven-two conserva-
tive majority characteristic of the 1949-53 period was still present.
This left Justices Douglas and Black in splendid isolation as before.
The conservative wing's dominance is demonstrated by comparing
the dissent rates of Douglas (40.3%) and Black (38.6%) with those of
Reed (13.3%) and Burton (14.1%), the two most conservative Jus-
tices during the Term. The polarization between Justices at the
Court's extremes remained at the very high levels which prevailed
since the Stone era.
The major event of the Term was Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 2 " the blockbuster decision outlawing segregated schools.
Brown, of course, was a classic illustration of the liberal activism for
which the Warren Court would later become famous. It was, how-
ever, the only landmark case of the October 1953 Term. 12 5 In gen-
eral, the mood of judicial restraint that had dominated the Vinson
era prevailed. 2
A succession during the October 1954 Term did not affect the
Court's balance of power. Robert H. Jackson, Frankfurter's ally in
the cause of restraint and moderation, died on October 8, 1954. Ei-
senhower chose John Marshall Harlan to succeed Jackson. 2
Harlan, the conservative conscience of the Warren Court, promptly
took over Jackson's position in the right wing with Frankfurter.
Harlan remained at the Court's extreme right until his resignation
in 1971.
The October 1954 Term, second of the Warren era, witnessed a
sharp shift to the left in the Court's balance of power. Dissent rates
on the left plunged to roughly half the level of the prior Term. In
contrast, the dissent rate of Reed, the Court's most conservative Jus-
tice, doubled.
124. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (9-0 decision).
125. Other cases with a liberal-activist tone included Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954) (5-3 decision) (criminal procedure; coerced confession); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (9-0 decision) (school segregation); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (9-0
decision) (jury discrimination); Accardi v. Shaughnessey, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (5-4 decision)
(deportation); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (6-3 decision) (maritime
personal injury).
126. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (7-2 decision) (deportation); Barsky
v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (6-3 decision) (subversion); Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128 (1954) (5-4 decision) (electronic surveillance).
127. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 2803-20. Harlan was an ex-
Wall Street antitrust defense lawyer, and he carried his conservative, pro-business values into
the Court.
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TABLE 19
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1953 & 1954 TERMS
OCT. 1953 OCT. 1954
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Douglas 41.4% 24.7% -16.7%
Black 36.2% 16.0% -20.2%
CONSERVATIVE
Reed 16.2% 31.7% + 15.5%
The change in the Court's balance of power during the October
1954 Term reflected a liberal trend in the voting patterns of Justices
Warren, Frankfurter, and Clark. All three shifted to the left of the
Court's center. The following table shows the striking change in
Warren's alignment in his first two Terms.
TABLE 20
WARREN'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1953
AND 1954 TERMS
OCT. 1953 OCT. 1954
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Douglas 36.9% 21.5% -15.4%
Black 34.8% 16.5% -18.3%
CONSERVATIVE
Reed 25.4% 36.3% + 10.9%
In the spring of 1955, the Court issued decisions in several ar-
eas further reflecting its shift to the left. In four cases, the Court
came to the aid of victims of the McCarthy-era witch hunts.'2 8 In
the race relations area, the Court issued Brown H"9 and threw out a
criminal conviction because of jury discrimination.'10 The Court also
reversed the contempt conviction of a policeman who committed per-
jury in a gambling investigation.' These cases fueled the fires of
128. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (7-2 decision) (discharge of federal em-
ployee); Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955) (6-3 decision) (House Un-American Activ-
ities Committee contempt sanctions); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (6-3 deci-
sion) (contempt sanctions); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (7-2 decision)
(contempt sanctions).
129. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (9-0 decision) (laying out the initial
ground rules for remedying school segregation).
130. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955) (6-3 decision).
131. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (6-3 decision).
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anti-Court sentiment that was then emerging in response to the
Brown I decision. The majority in these cases normally included
Justices Douglas, Black, Warren, Clark, and Frankfurter. Justices
Harlan, Burton, Minton, and Reed dissented most often."'
During the October 1955 Term, a development occurred within
the Court's liberal wing that had important ramifications throughout
the remainder of the Warren era. Earl Warren, after two Terms at
the Court's center, moved squarely into the liberal camp with Doug-
las and Black, creating a tight, three-vote liberal bloc. The cohesion
on the left is shown in the following table.
TABLE 21
DOUGLAS', BLACK'S AND WARREN'S AGREEMENT
RATES-OCTOBER 1955 TERM
Black Warren
Douglas 95.7% 90.1%
Black - 96.7%
The 96.7% agreement rate between Warren and Black was the high-
est rate for any pair of Justices in the four Terms that comprised the
Warren Court's early years.
Harlan, during his first full Term on the Court, held a strongly
conservative position. In fact, Harlan's voting pattern was distinctly
the most conservative on the entire Court. Meanwhile, Frankfurter
moved sharply to the right, leaving the position in the center that he
had occupied during the prior Term. Frankfurtur initiated the close
partnership with Harlan that would last until Frankfurter's retire-
ment in 1962. Frankfurter and Harlan agreed in 90.4% (85/94) of
the cases in which both participated during the Term.
The trend toward liberal activism that began in Earl Warren's
first two Terms continued in the October 1955 Term. As the follow-
ing table shows, the liberals dissented less frequently than the con-
servatives, a pattern drastically different from the 1949-53 period,
when the liberals' dissent rates were triple or quadruple those of the
conservatives.
132. During the Term the Court also reaffirmed its commitment to the constitutional
revolution of 1937 upholding the master theme of judicial restraint in economic cases in the
oft-cited case, Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (8-0 decision) (substantive
due process; equal protection).
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TABLE 22
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1955 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENTS DISSENT RATE
LIBERAL
Douglas 22 23.4%
Black 16 17.0%
Warren 13 14.3%
Average 17.0 18.3%
CONSERVATIVE
Burton 19 20.2%
Frankfurter 21 22.8%
Harlan 18 23.1%
Average 19.3 22.0%
As the table shows, however, neither the liberals nor the conserva-
tives were dominant: the dissent rates at both extremes were in the
same range.
Polarized bloc voting increased during the October 1955 Term.
Three blocs were present: Douglas, Black, and Warren; Harlan and
Frankfurter; and Minton, Reed, and Burton. In thirty of the ninety-
four cases decided, the entire liberal bloc disagreed with at least one
of the conservative blocs. Important liberal victories included Cole v.
Young, 33 Communist Party v. SACB,"'3 Griffin v. Illinois,'
Slochower v. Board of Education,' Pennsylvania v. Nelson,37
Rea v. United States,'88 and United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles. 89 The conservatives also won a number of major victories
including United States v. DuPont,40 Jay v. Boyd,' Black v. Cut-
ter Laboratories,4 UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board,4 ' and Ullman v. United States.'"
133. 351 U.S. 536 (1956) (6-3 decision) (loyalty-security).
134. 351 U.S. 115 (1956) (6-3 decision) (communist registration requirement).
135. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (5-4 decision) (equal protection clause requires a free trial
transcript for an indigent defendant's appeal; seminal case of Griffin-Douglas rule).
136. 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (5-4 decision) (loyalty-security).
137. 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (6-3 decision) (landmark case holding that the Smith Act pre-
empts the States from investigating and punishing subversion against the federal government).
138. 350 U.S. 214 (1955) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; exclusionary rule).
139. 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (6-3 decision) (courts martial).
140. 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (4-3 decision) (antitrust).
141. 351 U.S. 345 (1956) (5-4 decision) (deportation).
142. 351 U.S. 292 (1956) (6-3 decision) (loyalty-security).
143. 351 U.S. 266 (1956) (6-3 decision) (labor).
144. 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (6-2 decision) (subversion; privilege against self-
incrimination).
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The Supreme Court underwent two personnel changes during
the October 1956 Term. The first, which involved a major change in
the liberal-conservative balance of power, was the retirement of
Sherman Minton on October 15, 1956 and the seating of William J.
Brennan the following day. Minton had been a moderate conserva-
tive. Brennan, in contrast, would spend his lengthy tenure on the
Court as a member of the liberal wing; in fact, he was destined to
become elder statesman of the liberal cause after the resignation of
Douglas in 1975.14 Brennan promptly aligned himself with Earl
Warren and the liberals, returning the liberal wing to four Justices.
The second change was the retirement of Stanley F. Reed on
February 25, 1957, and the seating of his successor Charles E.
Whittaker on March 24, 1957.14 Reed began his Court tenure as a
moderate liberal, but later, as the Court shifted to the left, he became
a member of the conservative wing. In fact, he had the most con-
servative voting pattern on the Court during the October 1953 and
1954 Terms. Whittaker was also a conservative, however, so this
change did not substantially alter the basic balance of power on the
Court.'4 7
The Court retained its relatively liberal posture in the October
1956 Term, as shown by the fact that the conservatives again dis-
sented more frequently than the liberals.
145. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 2849-65. During the Warren
era, Brennan was the "bridge-builder between the liberal and conservative Justices." Id. at
2852.
146. See id. at 2893-2904; Note, Mr. Justice Whittaker: The Man on the Right, 19
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1039 (1979).
147. "Whittaker immediately aligned himself with the conservative Justices on the
Court." L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 2896. "By and large, . ... Whittaker
voted for what one would have to call the conservative position." Id. at 2898.
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TABLE 23
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1956 TERM
DISSENT CHANGE FROM
JUSTICE DISSENTS RATE PRIOR TERM
LIBERAL
Douglas 28 22.9% -0.5%
Black 24 20.9% + 3.9%
Warren 13 10.9% -3.4%
Total 65
CONSERVATIVE
Frankfurter 35 28.5% + 5.7%
Harlan 33 27.3% +4.2%
Burton 36 29.5% +9.3%
Total 104 29.5% +9.3%
The Court's liberalism during the October 1956 Term has been
widely recognized in historical writing.""' The most important and
controversial issue of that Term involved the degree to which the
government could infringe individual rights in order to identify and
suppress allegedly subversive activities. Numerous other famous de-
cisions were issued in fields such as labor relations, criminal proce-
dure, and free speech."' The culmination of the trend and climax of
the Warren Court's early years occurred on "Red Monday," June
17, 1957, one of the most notable days in the history of the Court,
when the Yates, Sweezy, Watkins, Jencks, Konigsberg, and Schware
decisions were issued.
A brief review is appropriate here. The most salient trend dur-
ing Earl Warren's first four Terms was the reappearance of liberal
activism on the United States Supreme Court. In the last Term of
the Vinson era, the Court had only two liberals, Douglas and Black,
148. E.g., A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 3-4 (1958).
149. The leading cases involving Communism, loyalty-security programs, and related
issues included Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S 298
(1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957); Jencks v. United States 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S.
252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Other major cases
decided during the October 1956 Term included Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
(6-3 decision) (free speech; obscenity); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (9-0
decision) (criminal procedure; McNabb-Mallory rule; federal supervisory power; prompt ar-
raignment); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (6-2 decision) (court-martial); United States v.
DuPont, 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (4-2 decision) (antitrust); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (7-1 decision) (labor; pre-emption); San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957) (6-2 decision) (labor; pre-emption).
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and their dissent rates stood at moderfi record levels. The seven-vote
conservative majority had nearly absolute control. Earl Warren
brought the liberal bloc back to three when he lined up with Doug-
las and Black in the October 1955 Term after two Terms in the
center. William Brennan added a fourth liberal vote when he joined
the Court in 1956.
During this same period, the Court's conservative wing shrank
from seven to four Justices. The replacement of Jackson by Harlan
in 1955 and Reed by Whittaker in 1957 did not change matters, but
the replacement of Vinson by Warren in 1953 and Minton by Bren-
nan in 1956 were losses for the conservatives and gains for the liber-
als. During the same years, Clark moved out of the conservative
wing and into the Court's center.
With increasing strength on the left came increasing dissent on
the right. During the October 1953 Term, when they were domi-
nant, the most conservative members of the Court had dissent rates
below twenty percent. By the October 1956 Term, dissent rates on
the right had risen to near the thirty percent level. Table 24 illus-
trates the shift to the left in the Court's balance of power in the early
years of the Warren era.
TABLE 24
DISSENT RATES OF LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES-
OCTOBER 1953 AND 1956 TERMS
DISSENT RATE
JUSTICE OCT. 1953 OCT. 1956 CHANGE
LIBERAL
Douglas 41.4% 22.9% -18.5%
Black 36.6% 20.9% -15.7%
CONSERVATIVE
Frankfurter 15.1% 28.5% +13.4%
Burton 15.1% 29.5% +14.5%
By the end of the October 1956 Term, the Court had the fol-
lowing closely-balanced 4-1-4 alignment:
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TABLE 25
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1956 TERM
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Douglas Clark Burton
Black Harlan
Warren Frankfurter
Brennan Whittaker
2. The Warren Court's Middle Period: The Liberal Trend
Abates (1958-62)
The Warren Court's trend toward liberal activism abated some-
what during the 1958-62 period. During this second or middle pe-
riod of the Warren era, a highly polarized Court stepped back and
adopted a relatively restrained posture that was less liberal than in
the October 1955 and 1956 Terms.15 °
One cause of this retrenchment was the widespread public out-
rage that the Court's liberal activism had provoked."' The repres-
sive mood of the late 1940's and early 1950's had softened to some
degree, but the shadows of the Cold War, the McCarthy era, and
the Korean War still lay heavily on the land. Several years were yet
to pass before the next reform period would take hold of the Ameri-
can people. In the mid-1950's, tension continued to grow between
the Court, the conservative forces within Congress, and the nation at
large. This lead a well known constitutional scholar to observe:
Dissenting Justices and constitutional lawyers are outspoken in
protest; members of Congress are stunned though not silenced.
Not since 1937 when F.D.R. declared war on the Nine Old
Men, has judicial authority been so roundly criticized. One
hears again a familiar echo: "Curb that Court before it destroys
the nation." ''
150. See Galloway, The Second Period of the Warren Court: The Liberal Trend Abates
(1957-1961), 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 947 (1979). In spite of the article's title, the shift to
the right that characterized the Warren Court's middle period began in June 1958 and ended
in April 1962. The relatively conservative period in the late 1950's has been identified by a
number of commentators. E.g., J. CASPER, THE POLITICS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 68-75 (1972);
G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED 102-04 (1974).
151. See, e.g., C. PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT, 1957-1960
(1961); Why Supreme Court Is Under Fire, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 27, 1958,
at 44-46.
152. A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 3 (1958). The hos-
tility toward the Court at the time was not based solely upon earlier decisions dealing with
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As a result, the Court pulled back and adopted a more conservative,
restrained attitude during the next few years.
The shift to the right that characterized the Warren Court's
middle period began in the summer of 1958. Voting data show that
the liberals still maintained a slight edge in the won-lost column in
early 1958. The conservative wing took command in the summer of
1958, issuing a series of decisions which drew bloc-dissents from the
liberal wing. For example, in the controversial anti-subversion field,
the conservatives won Beilan v. Board of Education'" and Lerner
v. Casey."4 Similarly, the conservatives prevailed in a series of di-
vided criminal procedure cases, including Knapp v. Schweitzer,"'
Gore v. United States,"' Ashdown v. Utah,"57 and Crooker v. Cali-
fornia. 1 5  In the series of seventeen consecutive cases beginning with
Leng May Ma v. Barber," the four liberals cast thirty-seven dis-
sents while the five moderates and conservatives cast only six."60
The voting pattern that emerged in June 1958 pitted a five-vote
coalition of conservatives and moderates including Justices Harlan,
Frankfurter, Burton, Whittaker, and Clark against the four liberals
Douglas, Black, Warren, and Brennan. The two blocs were highly
polarized. Eleven pairs of Justices had disagreement rates above fifty
percent as the following table shows.
political subversion. An extremely bitter reaction to the landmark school desegregation deci-
sion, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was also sweeping the nation. The
Court's increasingly liberal attitude toward the procedural rights of criminal defendants, e.g.,
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), had begun to elicit opposition. Moreover, the Court had
added new fuel to the fire at the end of the October 1956 Term by reversing the conviction of a
confessed rapist in another landmark decision, Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
153. 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (5-4 decision) (loyalty-security).
154. 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (5-4 decision) (loyalty-security).
155. 357 U.S. 371 (1958) (6-3 decision) (privilege against self-incrimination).
156. 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (5-4 decision) (multiple punishment).
157. 357 U.S. 426 (1958) (7-2 decision) (coerced confession).
158. 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (5-4 decision) (right to counsel).
159. 357 U.S. 185 (1958) (5-4 decision) (deportation).
160. The cases did not suggest retrenchment in the volatile race relations area. Indeed,
during the same end-of-Term crunch that produced the conservative landslide, the Court is-
sued its landmark ruling in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (9-0
decision) (order requiring disclosure of NAACP membership lists overturned).
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TABLE 26
DISAGREEMENT RATES ABOVE 50%
OCTOBER 1957 TERM
DOUGLAS BLACK WARREN
CLARK 52.0%
WHITTAKER 51.9%
BURTON 55.8% 50.0% 50.5%
FRANKFURTER 56.7% 55.4% 54.0%
HARLAN 57.7% 57.8% 52.5%
Similarly, the average number of dissents per case soared to 2.21, an
all-time record. Members of the Court were clearly waging an in-
tense struggle for control. 1 1
During the 1958 recess, conservative Justice Burton retired.
Potter Stewart, Burton's successor, was seated on the second day of
the October 1958 Term. 1" The Burton-Stewart succession did not
alter the Court's balance of power. Stewart, a moderately conserva-
tive Cincinnati Republican, promptly assumed Burton's place in the
moderate-conservative coalition."' For example, Stewart disagreed
with Douglas in 49.9% of the cases in the October 1958 Term; in
contrast, he disagreed with the conservative Whittaker in only 13.6%
of the cases. Stewart's alignment preserved the conservative wing's
narrow 5-4 majority.
With Stewart's support, the conservatives and moderates man-
aged to retain the slight advantage in the won-lost statistics they had
achieved the prior Term.'" Justices Douglas, Black, and Warren
had the highest dissent rates on the Court. Douglas' 36.4% dissent
rate was the highest of any Justice since the October 1953 Term.
161. In this regard, the October 1957 Term is similar to the October 1948 Term, when
the libertarian four challenged Vinson, Burton, Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson for control of
the Court. See supra pp. 586-87.
162. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 2921-38.
163. "In the great majority of the cases in which the Court has divided along activist-
passivist lines . . . he [Stewart] has clearly sided with those Justices commonly identified as
favoring a passivist viewpoint." Id. at 2925-26.
164. Major conservative victories during the October 1958 Term included Barr v. Mat-
teo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (5-4 decision) (defamation); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167
(1959) (6-3 decision) (abstention); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (5-4 deci-
sion) (subversion); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) (5-4 decision) (subversion); Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; fourth amendment).
Liberal victories included Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (5-4 decision) (subversion);
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (5-3 decision) (jury trial); Irvin v.
Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; publicity); FHA v. The Dar-
lington, 358 U.S. 84 (1958) (5-3 decision) (statutory construction).
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Late in the Term, the liberals were badly defeated. In a string of
fourteen cases decided in June 1959, the four liberal Justices cast
thirty-two dissenting votes; the remaining Justices cast only five.165
Thus, a basically conservative Term was capped by a strongly con-
servative finish.
The voting alignment that emerged during the October 1958
Term and remained until the resignations of Whittaker and Frank-
furter in April 1962, is shown in the following table.
TABLE 27
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES -
OCTOBER 1958, 1960 TERMS
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Douglas Clark - Harlan
Black Stewart -*' Frankfurter
Warren Whittaker
Brennan
The Court remained intensely polarized throughout this period.
In contrast to the Court, the nation moved to the left during the
October 1958 Term. For instance, the 1958 off-year election pro-
duced a democratic landslide, setting the stage for John F. Kennedy's
presidential victory in 1960, and the reform movements that charac-
terized the early 1960's.
Hostile public reaction to the Court's liberal outburst at the end
of the October 1956 Term may have discouraged the Court from
moving to the left with the nation. During the October 1957 and
1958 Terms, this reaction was at its peak. Numerous anti-Supreme
Court measures were introduced in Congress. Posters proclaiming
"Impeach Earl Warren" appeared. The assembled chief justices of
the state supreme courts protested the Court's interventionist role.
Conservative criticism of the Court abounded. Perhaps the Court
was intimidated.
The liberals regained some of their lost ground during the Oc-
tober 1959 Term.166 Dissent rates on the left fell. Meanwhile, dis-
165. Douglas and Warren both dissented in 9 of the 14 cases.
166. Important liberal victories during the Term included Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420 (1960) (7-2 decision) (civil rights); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (6-3 decision)
(free speech); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (9-0 decision) (freedom of
association); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (7-2 decision)
(court-martial); Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959) (6-3 decision) (tax). Conservative
victories during the Term included Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (5-4 decision)
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sent rates on the right rose by roughly fifty percent. In contrast to
the prior two Terms, conservative Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and
Whittaker cast more dissents than the three most liberal Justices
Douglas, Black, and Warren. This temporary change coincided with
a minor shift to the left by the Court's "swing" Justices: Clark
moved closer to the center of the Court, and Stewart moved away
from the conservatives, although he was still right-of-center.
Otherwise the voting patterns during this period were quite
similar to the prior two Terms. Dissent and disagreement rates once
again reached near record levels. The average dissent rate shot back
up to 2.15 dissents per case. Disagreement rates between Justices at
the Court's opposite extremes surpassed even the peak reached in the
October 1957 Term. Justice Douglas, for example, disagreed with
Harlan in sixty percent of the cases decided, and he disagreed with
Frankfurter in 59.4% of the cases. Similarly Black disagreed with
Frankfurter in 58.5% of the cases. These were the three highest one-
Term disagreement rates in the entire sixteen Terms of the Warren
era. Table 28 shows that eight pairs of Justices had disagreement
rates above fifty percent.
TABLE 28
DISAGREEMENT RATES ABOVE 50% - OCTOBER 1959 TERM
WHITTAKER HARLAN FRANKFURTER
DOUGLAS 55.2% 60.0% 59.4%
BLACK 52.1% 53.8% 58.5%
WARREN 1 J 51.6% J 53.2% 1
In 1960, the political posture of the nation shifted to the left,
initiating a liberal period that continued through the decade. In No-
vember, John F. Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon. Meanwhile the
civil rights movement was developing rapidly after the first sit-ins in
Greensboro, North Carolina in February 1960.
On the Supreme Court, however, the trend was the opposite.
During the October 1960 Term, the conservative voting patterns that
characterized the Warren Court's middle period continued. The
Court moved back to -the right, and the conservatives regained the
(procedural due process); DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (5-3 decision) (labor);
Mitchell v. H.B. Zachery Co., 362 U.S. 310 (1960) (5-4 decision) (Fair Labor Standards Act);
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; fourth amend-
ment); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960) (5-3 decision) (subversion); Inman
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 361 U.S. 138 (1959) (5-4 decision) (Federal Employer's Lia-
bility Act).
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edge in the win-loss statistics.1 7 The renewed conservative trend is
demonstrated by the Justices' dissent rates. Once again, Douglas dis-
sented more than Frankfurter and Harlan combined. Douglas' dis-
sent rate leaped to 40.5%, his highest since the October 1953 Term
when the liberal wing was a powerless minority of two. The follow-
ing table shows the conservative edge during the Term.
TABLE 29
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1960 TERM
DISSENT CHANGE FROM
JUSTICE DISSENTS RATE PRIOR TERM
LIBERAL
Douglas 45 40.5% + 10.3%
Black 29 26.1% - 0.5%
CONSERVATIVE
Harlan 21 19.4% -13.9%
Frankfurter 21 19.8% -15.3%
The conservative edge during the October 1960 Term coincided
with a definite shift in the voting pattern of Tom C. Clark. During
the prior Term, Clark had been aligned almost exactly between the
two wings. Only one year later, Clark was distinctly aligned with
167. Most of the conservative victories involved questions regarding subversive activities.
See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (5-4 decision); Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (5-4 decision); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (5-4 decision); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (5-4 decision);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (5-4 decision); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S.
431 (1961) (5-4 decision); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961) (5-4 decision);
Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960) (5-4 decision); McPhaul v. United States, 364
U.S. 372 (1960) (5-4 decision). Other conservative decisions included Cohen v. Hurley, 366
U.S. 117 (1961) (5-4 decision) (attorney discipline); Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301(1961) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure); Times Film Corp v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961)
(5-4 decision) (free speech).
In spite of the conservative edge in the voting statistics, a case can be made that the
October 1960 Term saw the birth of a liberal-activist period that accelerated in April 1962
and extended until 1969. For example, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which is gener-
ally considered the "watershed" case which began the Warren Court's criminal procedure
revolution, was decided during the Term. Other important liberal decisions included Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (9-0 decision) (freedom of religion); Noto v. United States,
367 U.S. 290 (1961) (9-0 decision) (subversion); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (9-0
decision) (criminal procedure; trial publicity); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961) (6-3 decision) (race; state action); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961) (9-0 decision) (criminal procedure; electronic surveillance); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961) (8-1 decision) (civil rights); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (5-4 decision)
(freedom of association); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (7-2 decision) (race);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (9-0 decision) (race; voting).
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the conservatives, as Table 30 shows.
TABLE 30
CLARK'S VOTING PATTERN - OCTOBER 1959 AND 1960 TERMS
DISAGREEMENTS WITH DISAGREEMENT RATE
CLARK WITH CLARK
OcT. 1959 OCT. 1960 OcT. 1959 OcT. 1960
JUSTICE TERM TERM TERM TERM
LIBERAL
Douglas 38 63 40.4% 57.8%
Black 30 49 32.6% 45.0%
Warren 23 39 25.0% 35.8%
Total 91 151
CONSERVATIVE
Harlan 33 23 35.1% 21.7%
Frankfurter 30 21 31.6% 20.2%
Whittaker 26 26 27.4% 23.9%
Total 89 70 1
Note particularly Clark's extremely high (57.8%) disagreement rate
with Douglas. On the basis of these votes, Clark must be classified as
a member of the conservative bloc during the October 1960 Term.
As a result of Clark's shift to the right, Stewart found himself in the
middle between two four-vote wings.168 Stewart leaned toward the
right, but to a lesser degree than Clark.
. Levels of disagreement and polarization remained at the high
level that characterized the Warren Court's period of conservative
resurgence. The average dissent rate (2.11 dissents per case) was the
third highest of the Warren era. Five pairs of Justices disagreed in
more than fifty percent of the cases." ' A definite pattern of polarized
voting involving two four-vote blocs emerged. The liberal wing in-
cluded the cohesive three-vote group of Justices Black, Warren, and
Brennan, with Douglas off to the left. Harlan and Frankfurter were
closely aligned in the conservative wing, with Clark somewhat to the
left and Whittaker somewhat to the right. Whittaker occupied the
far right position during his last Term.
The conservative trend continued into the October 1961 Term.
168. The old saw familiar during Stewart's early years, "as Stewart goes, so goes the
Court," was quite accurate in bloc-voting cases during the October 1960 Term. In the two
prior Terms, Clark was the Justice who most frequently cast the controlling swing vote.
169. Douglas's disagreement rates with the conservatives remained at the very high
levels typical of this period: 58.5% with Frankfurter, 56.5 % with Harlan, 55.0% with Whitta-
ker, and 57.9% with Clark.
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From October 1961 through March 1962, the liberals continued to
dissent more often than the conservatives. The highest dissent rates
were those of Douglas (30.3%) and Black (30.3%). Dissent rates of
the conservatives, Whittaker (15.2%), Frankfurter (21.2%) and
Harlan (21.2%), were lower.17 0 The conservatives won several split
decisions during these final months of the Warren Court's second
period. 1
An obvious hypothesis is that the abatement in the liberal trend
was a response to adverse public opinion. The public outcry focused
primarily on subversion and race discrimination cases and seconda-
rily on criminal procedure cases. An examination of the Court's re-
sponse in these areas may be of interest.
The voting data of the Court in the subversion cases show a
clear retreat. During the October 1957 through 1960 Terms, nearly
all the major subversion cases resulted in conservative victories, usu-
ally by a 5-4 margin. There can be almost no doubt that, over the
protests of the four liberals, the Court's conservatives and moderates
gave way to public opinion and curbed the growing liberalism that
had characterized the 1955-57 period in this area.
In race discrimination cases, the voting data show quite a differ-
ent trend. The Court did not split into liberal and conservative blocs
on this issue. Instead, in most cases the Court unanimously sup-
ported the position of racial minorities. However, an argument can
be made that the Court deferred to public reaction by simply refus-
ing to confront the difficult issues. There were exceptions. In
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson'72 the Court gave constitu-
tional protection to NAACP's membership list. Cooper v. Aaron"7
held that integration of public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas could
not be delayed because of public defiance. Gomillion v. Lightfoot'"
and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority175 indicated that the
Court was ready to pick up the cudgel once again. But apart from
170. These percentages are based on the 33 cases decided before Whittaker left Court.
They extended from the start of the Term through Teamsters Local Union v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
171. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) (6-3 decision) (criminal proce-
dure; right of allocution); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (5-4 decision) (criminal proce-
dure; advance notice); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962) (5-4 decision) (criminal
procedure; right of allocution); Mechling Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U.S. 324 (1961)
(5-4 decision) (administrative law); Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961) (5-4 deci-
sion) (loyalty-security).
172. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
173. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
174. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
175. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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these rather infrequent exceptions, the Court was quite restrained
during the late 1950's and early 1960's on segregation issues.1 76
In the criminal procedure area as with the subversion cases, the
Court split into two distinct blocs. The four liberals persisted in their
demand for constitutional reform, but they were unable to win a
clear victory. Instead the conservatives and moderates pulled their
five votes together and kept the Court in a position of relative re-
straint. Only at the end of the period in the Mapp case,17 7 did the
Court inaugurate the activism that was to become one of the major
hallmarks of the 1960's.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of the abatement of the liberal
trend is simply the relative absence of landmark cases. Apart from
NAACP v. Alabama, Cooper v. Aaron, and Mapp v. Ohio, major
historic cases are lacking. Almost every Term in the 1960's saw
more liberal landmark cases than the entire four years of the Warren
Court's second period of conservative resurgence.
3. The Warren Court's Final Years: A Heyday of Liberal Ac-
tivism (1962-69)
In 1962, the relatively conservative middle period of the Warren
era ended, and the period of liberal activism for which the Warren
Court is so famous began.178 A major shift to the left occurred in
April 1962, when the Court's three-vote conservative bloc was deci-
mated by Whittaker's retirement on April 1, 1962 and the onset of
Frankfurter's final illness on April 30, 1962. Suddenly the conserva-
tive forces were reduced from three to one, and the four-vote liberal
bloc took control.
During the remainder of the October 1961 Term, the liberals
had a 4-2-1 majority in most cases. Voting data show an immediate
change in the balance of power. Dissent rates on the left plunged,
while dissent rates on the right soared.
176. Jonathan Casper has speculated, "Perhaps the Court found shortly that more af-
firmative and aggressive action in favor of integration was politically infeasible or unwise." J.
CASPER, THE POLITICS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 180 (1972).
177. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
178. See Galloway, The Third Period of the Warren Court: Liberal Dominance (1962-
1969), 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 773 (1980).
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TABLE 31
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1961 TERM
BEFORE AFTER
JUSTICE APRIL 1, 1962 APRIL 1, 1962 CHANGE
LIBERAL
Douglas 30.3% 21.2% - 9.1%
Black 30.3% 15.7% -14.6%
Warren 21.2% 11.8% -10.2%
MODERATE &
CONSERVATIVE
Clark " 6.1% 19.2% +13.1%
Stewart 9.4% 19.2% + 9.8%
Harlan 21.2% 36.5% +15.3%
Immediately the Court began issuing the liberal-activist deci-
sions characteristic of the 1960's. The case which best symbolizes the
onset of liberal control is Baker v. Carr,' the landmark decision
holding that malapportionment of electoral districts presents a justi-
ciable issue under the equal protection clause. Shortly thereafter, the
Court decided Engel v. Vitale,18 0 the controversial school prayer
case. And on the last day of the Term, the Court issued its decision
in Robinson v. California,"' "incorporating" the eighth amendment
ban on cruel and unusual punishment and confirming that the fa-
mous constitutional revolution in criminal procedure had begun. Af-
ter years of minority status, the liberal activists eagerly began writ-
ing their favorite doctrines into law.""
On April 16, 1962, Byron R. White was seated to replace Jus-
tice Whittaker. 8 White, a former Rhodes Scholar and professional
football star, turned out to be a moderate conservative, so his ap-
pointment did not substantially affect the Court's balance of power.
179. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (6-2 decision). Baker was decided on March 26, 1962, in the
brief period between the departures of Whittaker and Frankfurter. Warren later claimed that
Baker was the most important case of his entire tenure. See infra note 234.
180. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (6-1 decision).
181. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (6-2 decision).
182. Other liberal victories in bloc-voting cases in the October 1961 Term included In
re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962) (5-2 decision) (criminal contempt); Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49 (1962) (4-3 decision) (criminal procedure); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) (6-
3 decision) (citizenship); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962) (5-4
decision) (antitrust); FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360 (1962) (6-3 decision), (trade
regulation); ICC v. J-T Transp. Co., 368 U.S. 81 (1961) (6-3 decision) (common carriers).
183. For a biographical sketch of White, see L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23,
at 2951-74.
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He was, however, less conservative than Whittaker, especially in
race cases. Therefore, the Whittaker-White succession comprised a
minor shift to the left.
The second personnel change of 1962 was one of the most im-
portant in the history of the United States Supreme Court. After
being absent from the Court since April 30, Frankfurter, the leader
of the conservative wing, resigned on August 28, 1962. President
Kennedy appointed Arthur J. Goldberg, a liberal, to fill the va-
cancy. 84 With the seating of Goldberg on the first day of the Octo-
ber 1962 Term, the liberal wing attained a five-vote majority consist-
ing of Justices Douglas, Black, Warren, Brennan, and Goldberg. No
longer would the liberal Justices have to tailor their decisions to pick
up at least one vote from the conservative side. Henceforth, the con-
tours of the Court's decisions lay entirely within the control of the
liberals.
With the seating of Goldberg, the Court reached the most lib-
eral posture in its history to that date. The following table shows the
Court's underlying balance of power in the Goldberg years (1962-
65).
TABLE 32
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1962 THROUGH 1964 TERMS
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Douglas White Harlan
Black Clark
Goldberg Stewart -
Warren
Brennan
The remarkable scope of the Court's shift to the left in the first dec-
ade of the Warren era becomes clear when one recalls that the con-
servative wing had a 7-2 majority as late as the October 1952
Term."8 5
Voting data for the October 1962 Term suggest that the liberal
majority wasted little time making its presence felt. The swing to the
left that began in the prior Term accelerated, reaching a point that
184. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 2977-90. Goldberg was "one of
the most activist-liberal judges ever to occupy a seat on the Court." CASPER, THE POLITICS OF
CIVIL LIBERTIES 80 (1972). Goldberg had been counsel for the United Steelworkers and the
AFL-CIO earlier in his career. He was both an economic liberal and a civil libertarian during
his brief tenure on the Court.
185. See supra p. 589, table 15.
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deserves to be called liberal dominance. The following table shows
the drastic drop in the liberals' dissent rates and the corresponding
increase in the dissent rates of the moderates and conservatives.
TABLE 33
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1960, 1961 & 1962 TERMS
OCT. 1960 OCT. 1961 OCT. 1962
JUSTICE TERM TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Douglas 40.5% 24.7% 18.0% -22.5%
Black 26.1% 21.4% 16.2% - 9.9%
Warren 13.9% 15.5% 7.4% -11.5%
Brennan 18.9% 5.9% 5.4% -13.5%
Average 26.1% 16.9% 11.8%
MODERATE &
CONSERVATIVE
Clark 18.3% 14.1% 22.7% + 4.4%
Stewart 18.3% 15.5% 29.7% + 11.4%
Harlan 19.4% 30.6% 40.9% +21.5%
Average 18.7% 20.1% 31.0%
Harlan, the Court's sole remaining conservative, had the highest
one-Term dissent rate (40.9%) of any conservative Justice since the
constitutional revolution of 1937, a record that still stands today. In
contrast, Justices Warren and Douglas had their lowest dissent rates
since the start of the Warren era.
The October 1962 Term witnessed a tremendous outburst of
liberal-activist decisions. Most remarkable was Green Monday,
March 18, 1963, when the Court issued a series of landmark deci-
sions including Townsend v. Sain,'" Gideon v. Wainwright,187
Douglas v. California,"' and Fay v. Noia.'" Clearly the constitu-
tional revolution in criminal procedure was in full force. Other fa-
mous liberal victories were scattered throughout the Term: NAACP
v. Button,190 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,"1 Gibson v. Florida
186. 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; habeas corpus).
187. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (9-0 decision) (criminal procedure; assistance of counsel). See
A. LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964), for an account of this famous case.
188. 372 U.S. 353 (1963)(6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; equal protection). This is
the Douglas of the famous Griffin-Douglas rule.
189. 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; habeas corpus).
190. 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (5-4 decision) (first amendment; attorney solicitation).
191. 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (5-4 decision) (citizenship).
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Legislative Investigation Committee,192 Peterson v. City of Green-
ville,193 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 94 Sherbert v. Verner,'95
and Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy.'96 Moreover, the Court unani-
mously pledged its allegiance to the rule of constitutional restraint in
economic cases in the oft-cited case, Ferguson v. Skrupa." 7 Overall,
the October 1962 Term may have been the most liberal and activist
in the history of the United States Supreme Court.
During the October 1963 Term, the five-vote liberal wing con-
tinued to dominate the Court. Harlan's dissent rate of 37.6% was
more than triple the average dissent rate of the liberals. In fact,
Harlan dissented more than Justices Douglas, Goldberg, Warren,
and Brennan combined. The extent of liberal dominance became
quite apparent at the very end of the Term when a striking outburst
of judicial activism occurred. Interestingly, Black showed signs of
faltering from his characteristic liberalism during this stretch, dis-
senting in four of the liberal victories.
The Court again issued a series of landmark decisions during
the October 1963 Term. For example, Reynolds v. Sims,' 98 the sec-
ond great case of the legislative reapportionment revolution, adopted
the one person, one vote rule as the controlling test under the equal
protection clause. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 9' the seminal
case in the public defamation field, banned libel suits against public
officials absent actual malice. The constitutional revolution in crimi-
nal procedure was carried forward in Escobedo v. Illinois,2'" Malloy
v. Hogan,'0' and other cases. The Court's commitment to the ongo-
ing struggle for the civil rights of racial minorities was confirmed in
Bell v. Maryland, °20 NAACP v. Alabama,203 and Griffin v. School
Board.0 4 Other liberal landmark decisions were issued as well.' 0 '
192. 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (5-4 decision) (subversion).
193. 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (8-1 decision) (prosecution of civil rights demonstrators).
194. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (8-1 decision) (freedom of religion; establishment clause).
195. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (7-2 decision) (freedom of religion; free exercise clause).
196. 374 U.S. 469 (1963) (5-4 decision) (deportation).
197. 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (9-0 decision) (substantive due process).
198. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (8-1 decision).
199. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (9-0 decision).
200. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (5-4 decision) (right to counsel at police interrogation).
201. 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (5-4 decision) (incorporation of privilege against self-incrimi-
nation).
202. 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (6-3 decision) (prosecution of civil rights demonstrators).
203. 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (9-0 decision) (freedom of association).
204. 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (7-2 decision) (school desegregation).
205. E.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (6-3 decision) (denial of
passport); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (6-3 decision) (free speech; obscenity); Bag-
gett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (7-2 decision) (loyalty oath); Massiah v. United States, 377
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When the October 1964 Term opened, the nation was prepar-
ing for a presidential election. The Democrats nominated incumbent
President Lyndon B. Johnson, a liberal in areas dear to the Court
such as race relations and aid for the poor. Johnson was elected by a
landslide. The nation rejected the conservative Barry Goldwater in
favor of another four years of Kennedy-Johnson policies. The liberal
mood permeated Congress as well. For example, in 1964 Congress
enacted both the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Economic Devel-
opment Act of 1964 to declare its "war on poverty."
Voting statistics for the October 1964 Term show a continua-
tion of liberal dominance.20 6 For example, Warren and Brennan, the
core of the liberal bloc, had dissent rates of only 5.7% and 2.2%
respectively. Brennan's dissent rate was the lowest of any Justice
since the start of the Warren era and the second lowest one-Justice/
one-Term dissent rate during Warren's sixteen Terms on the Court.
The voting patterns; however, were quite different from prior
Terms. There was almost no bloc voting. Patterns of agreement and
disagreement were nebulous. Rather than dividing along the ex-
pected 5-3-1 lines, the Court tended toward a 2-5-2 voting pattern.
In the center of the Court was a five-vote cluster comprised of Jus-
tices Warren, Brennan, Goldberg, White, and Clark. Douglas and
Black were on the left and Harlan and Stewart were on the right. 07
U.S. 20 (1964) (criminal procedure; right to counsel); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964)(5-3 decision) (denaturalization); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex. rel. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (6-2 decision) (attorney solicitation); Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964) (6-3 decision) (legislative reapportionment).
206. Major liberal decisions included Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (7-
2 decision) (right of privacy); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (5-4 decision) (bill
of attainder); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (5-2 decision) (free speech; absten-
tion); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (9-0 decision) (criminal procedure; incorporation
of confrontation clause); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (5-4 decision) (race; prosecu-
tion of civil rights demonstrators); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (5-4
decision) (race; abatement of criminal prosecution of civil rights protestors); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (9-0 decision), and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (9-0 decision) (constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (9-0 decision) (race; prohibition of
interracial cohabitation).
207. Overall, the voting statistics suggest that the October 1964 Term marked a break-
ing of the ranks among the previously cohesive liberal forces. The last time this phenomenon
occurred in the Court's left wing was during the 1940's. During the period prior to FDR's
appointments, the liberals voted as a bloc, frequently in dissent. During the period immedi-
ately after the constitutional revolution of 1937, the liberals also voted as a tight bloc; they had
to remain cohesive in order to muster a majority. By 1941, however, the liberal majority was
assured, and there was no need for the members of the liberal bloc to vote together. As a result,
they broke ranks and began to move toward a new position that split the former bloc members
into new alignments. A similar process seems to have been at work during the October 1964
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Voting data suggest that the October 1964 Term constituted a
shift toward more conservative patterns. Dissent rates on the left in-
creased substantially; those on the right dropped. As the following
table shows, Douglas and Black actually dissented more than Harlan
and Stewart.
TABLE 34
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1963 & 1964 TERMS
OCT. 1963 OCT. 1964
TUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Douglas 14.8% 25.6% + 10.8%
Black 18.0% 27.8% + 9.8%
MODERATE &
CONSERVATIVE
Clark 18.9% 8.9% -10.0%
Stewart 19.1% 19.3% + 0.2%
Harlan 37.6% 22.5% -15.1%
Justice Goldberg resigned during the 1965 recess to become am-
bassador to the United Nations. During his three terms, Goldberg
usually sided with the liberals, particularly with Warren and Bren-
nan, thereby assuring liberal control over the Court's decisions.
TABLE 35
GOLDBERG'S DISAGREEMENT RATES
LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE
OCT. TERM Warren Brennan Harlan
1962 17.8% 13.5% 39.8%
1963 12.1% 7.6% 39.8%
1964 14.2% 17.0% 26.7%
Obviously, the
forces.
loss of Goldberg created a major hole in the liberal
To replace Goldberg, President Johnson appointed his close
friend and advisor, Abe Fortas2 8 At the time of his appointment,
Term. The liberals, having finally achieved a clear majority on the Court, broke ranks. The
Court then moved toward a new consensus substantially to the left of the position that had
been dominant during the late 1950's when the liberals had to compromise to pick up extra
votes from outside their ranks.
208. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 3015-27.
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Fortas was already known for his liberal views, and he was expected
to fill Goldberg's slot in the liberal wing. The following table shows
that Fortas fulfilled those expectations during his four Terms on the
Court.
TABLE 36
FORTAs' DISAGREEMENT RATES
LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE
OcT. TERM Douglas Warren Brennan Marshall Harlan
1965 19.8% 8.1% 11.6% - 36.0%
1966 20.0% 11.7% 18.5% - 50.5%
1967 16.5% 13.2% 9.3% 10.2% 30.8%
1968 22.4% 17.9% 15.5% 16.3% 40.0%
As one commentator put it, "Fortas, like Goldberg, continued to
align himself with the Court's liberal group, almost solidifying the
five-to-four division. 20 9
In the nation at large, important events were taking place. The
civil rights movement had produced a violent backlash as exemplified
by events in Selma, Alabama during the spring of 1965. Later, in
August, the failure of President Johnson's Great Society to keep
pace with the rising expectations of the poor led to the Watts riot,
first in a series of riots that extended over the next few years. The
Vietnam war was emerging as a major political issue.
Despite both the loss of Goldberg and the turmoil in the nation,
the Court shifted toward more liberal voting patterns during the Oc-
tober 1965 Term.2 0 The dissent rates of Harlan, Stewart, and
209. Id. at 2959. "[F]rom his earliest days on the Supreme Court, Fortas was clearly
identifiable as a judicial activist. In cases involving the rights of criminal defendants, civil
rights, loyalty-security issues, and reapportionment, he almost always espoused the philosophy
of liberalism that had been the hallmark of the Warren Court." Id. at 3023.
210. Moreover, the flow of major activist cases did not slow appreciably. During the
October 1965 Term, noteworthy decisions were issued in several important legal fields. Crimi-
nal procedure cases included Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (5-4 decision) (police
interrogation); and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (8-1 decision) (trial publicity).
Race relations cases included Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (7-2 decision) (Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (9-0 decision) (Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (5-4 decision)
(Civi4l Rights Act of 1870); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (8-1 decision)(Voting Rights Act of 1965); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (5-4 decision) (prose-
cution of civil rights demonstrators); and Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (6-3 decision)
(segregated public parks). First amendment cases included Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11
(1966) (5-4 decision) (loyalty oath); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (6-3
decision) (obscenity); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (5-4 decision) (defamation of
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White rose in comparison to the prior Term; those of Douglas and
Black declined. The 2-5-2 voting pattern that emerged during the
preceding Term continued. Justices Warren, Brennan, Fortas,
White, and Clark occupied the center. Warren, Brennan, and Fortas
leaned to the left, while White and Clark leaned to the right. Doug-
las and Black comprised the left wing and Harlan and Stewart the
right.
Increased conflict and polarization characterized the national
political scene in 1966. Demands for reform intensified. Widespread
riots occurred in cities such as Chicago, Cleveland, and St. Louis
triggering a growing conservative backlash. Symbolically, the pro-
posed Civil Rights Act of 1966 died in the Senate. The Vietnam
build-up continued, and vocal opposition to the war grew. An eco-
nomic downturn complicated matters- during the 1966 bear mar-
ket, the Dow Jones average dropped twenty-five percent in eight
months. The Court, of course, was not insulated from these
pressures.
Some major shifts in voting patterns on the Court occurred dur-
ing the October 1966 Term. Generally, there was a trend toward a
polarized 4-1-4 voting alignment.' The statistics show four Justices
who leaned definitely to the left (Douglas, Fortas, Warren, and
Brennan), one Justice in the middle (Black), and four Justices who
leaned to the right-two slightly (White and Clark) and two deci-
sively (Stewart and Harlan).
In particular, Black's voting pattern underwent a noteworthy
shift during the October 1966 Term. For decades Black had occu-
pied a position near the Court's extreme left, and he agreed with the
liberals more often than with the conservatives. During the October
public official); and Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (5-4 decision)
(defamation in labor disputes). Voting rights cases included Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (6-3 decision) (poll tax), in addition to Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 787, and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301.
211. Victories for the liberal bloc included Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (5-
4 decision) (race; California's open housing proposition); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253
(1967) (5-4 decision) (citizenship); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967) (5-4 decision)
(criminal procedure; disclosure of evidence); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) (5-4 decision) (free speech; loyalty oath); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (5-4
decision) (criminal procedure; self-incrimination); and Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; self-incrimination). Victories for the conservative
bloc included Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (5-4 decision) (prosecution
of civil rights demonstrators); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (5-4 decision) (criminal
procedure; informer's privilege); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (5-4 decision)
(criminal procedure; search and seizure); Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966) (5-4 deci-
sion) (legislative reapportionment); and Adderley 0. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (5-4 decision)
(prosecution of civil rights demonstrators).
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1966 Term, in contrast, Black moved into a position very near the
center of the Court. The following table demonstrates Black's shift to
the right by comparing his alignment during the October 1962 and
1966 Terms.
TABLE 37
BLACK'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1962 & 1966 TERMS
OCT. 1962 OCT. 1966
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Douglas 18.0% 28.7% + 10.7%
Warren 11.5% 34.0% +22.5%
Brennan 14.4% 30.6% + 16.2%
CONSERVATIVE
Stewart 44.1% 33.0% -11.1%
Harlan 53.6% 39.6% -14.0%
Suddenly the liberal majority was in jeopardy, and it was once again
possible for the moderates and conservatives to muster a five-vote
coalition consisting of Black, White, Clark, Stewart, and Harlan.
Voting data suggest that the Court's moderate and conservative Jus-
tices, encouraged by the defection of Black and the growing backlash
within the nation, began to make a more serious effort to contest the
liberal wing's dominance. Disagreement rates jumped to the highest
levels since the October 1960 Term.""' Similarly, the average dissent
rate jumped from 1.47 to 1.99 per case, the highest during the
1960's.
In 1967 a personnel change occurred that re-established the
dominance of the liberal wing. On the last day of the October 1966
Term Justice Tom C. Clark, a moderate conservative, resigned. He
was replaced by Thurgood Marshall, a liberal, who was seated on
the first day of the October 1967 Term. 1' Marshall promptly lined
up with the liberals, and agreed with both Warren and Brennan in
over ninety percent of the cases decided in the October 1967 Term,
while disagreeing with Harlan in thirty percent of the cases. The
212. There were four disagreement rates of 50% or more, the first since the October
1962 Term: Douglas-Harlan (56.4%), Fortas-Harlan (50.5%), Fortas-Stewart (50.5%), and
Douglas-Stewart (50.0%).
213. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 3063-92. Marshall, the Court's
first black Justice, had been general counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund from 1938
to 1961. He had argued most of the leading race cases before the Court, including Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). He was expected to join the Court's liberal wing, and he
did so.
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Clark-Marshall succession gave the liberal wing the fifth vote it
needed to retain the majority status it had enjoyed since October
1962. The following table shows the alignment on the Court after
the arrival of Marshall.
TABLE 38
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1967 & 1968 TERMS
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Douglas -*- Black Harlan
Warren White
Brennan Stewart
Fortas
Marshall
At this point, the Court arguably reached its most liberal-ac-
tivist posture in its entire history. The five liberal activists were Jus-
tices Douglas, Fortas, Warren, Brennan, and Marshall. Although
Black had moved distinctly to the right and was no longer the unbri-
dled liberal he was during the 1930's and 1940's, he was still gener-
ally inclined to the left. White had been quite moderate since his
arrival on the Court in 1962 and had even leaned slightly to the left
during the October 1963 Term. Stewart had been a moderate con-
servative throughout his tenure. Even Harlan, the Court's only true
judicial conservative, was far less conservative than many earlier
Justices. Thus, the confluence of six liberals, 14 two moderates, and
one conservative created the most liberal bench in the Supreme
Court's history.
The dissent rates of the liberal Justices illustrate the extent of
liberal dominance during the October 1967 Term: Marshall, 1.7%;
Brennan 3.7%; Warren 5.5%; and Fortas 9.3%. Harlan dissented
more than all four of these liberals. Major liberal victories during
the Term included Katz v. United States,215 Green v. County School
Board,"' Flast v. Cohen,'1 7 and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. "8
Although now the Supreme Court had more liberal members
than ever before, the nation was swinging away from liberalism in
1968. A mood of anger and frustration prevailed, especially after the
214. This count includes Black.
215. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (7-1 decision) (criminal procedure; electronic surveillance).
216. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (9-0 decision) (race; school desegregation).
217. 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (8-1 decision) (taxpayer standing).
218. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (7-2 decision) (race; resurrection of Civil Rights Act of 1866).
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assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy in the
spring of 1968. On July 4, 1968, martial law was declared in Berke-
ley, California to quell disturbances arising in response to the
French general strike. The stock market was gripped by the first
stage of the bear market which would characterize 1968-70, and
there was violence in the streets at the Chicago National Democratic
Convention. In November, Richard Nixon edged Hubert Humphrey
for the presidency, marking the formal end of the liberal era that
began with John F. Kennedy's New Frontier. The representatives of
"law and order" and the "silent majority" took control of the execu-
tive branch.
The liberal bloc, however, exercised almost complete control
over the Court's decisions during the October 1968 Term, the last of
the Warren era.21' This is reflected in the extremely low liberal dis-
sent rates. Once again, Harlan dissented more than Fortas, Warren,
Brennan, and Marshall combined. Surprisingly, Stewart's dissent
rate exceeded Harlan's.
TABLE 39
DISSENTS & DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1968 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENTS DISSENT RATE
LIBERAL
Douglas 22 22.2%
Fortas 8 13.8%
Warren 9 9.2%
Brennan 2 2.0%
Marshall 6 6.7%
CONSERVATIVE
Harlan 32 32.7%
Stewart 33 33.3%
219. Characteristic liberal activism was present during the Term in a variety of impor-
tant areas: (1) race - Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (8-0 decision)
(prosecution of civil rights demonstrators); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (8-1 deci-
sion) (open housing); (2) criminal procedure - Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (6-2
decision) (incorporation of double jeopardy clause); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(6-2 decision) (fourth amendment; searches incident to arrest); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969) (7-2 decision) (legal assistance for prisoners); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969) (5-3 decision) (fourth amendment; probable cause); (3) legislative reapportionment -
Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969) (6-3 decision); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526
(1969) (6-3 decision); (4) free speech - Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (9-0 deci-
sion) (clear and present danger); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (9-0 decision) (pos-
session of obscene literature); and (5) poverty law - Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969) (7-1 decision) (procedural due process; debt collection); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (6-3 decision) (right of interstate migration; welfare).
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In summary, the final Term of the Warren era was almost
completely dominated by the liberal-activists. Both the decisions and
the voting data paint a picture of unchallenged liberal control. The
last two cases decided by the Warren Court-Chimel v. Califor-
nia," the landmark case which restricted the authority of police to
search suspects incident to arrest, and Benton v. Maryland,"' the
landmark case incorporating the double jeopardy clause-provide a
fitting conclusion to the liberal activism that dominated the 1962-69
period.
The following table illustrates the liberal dominance that char-
acterized the Warren Court's third and final period.
TABLE 40
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1961 THROUGH 1968 TERMS
LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE
OCT. TERM Warren Brennan Harlan
1961 15.5% 5.9% 30.6%
1962 7.4% 5.4% 40.9%
1963 6.3% 3.6% 37.6%
1964 5.7% 2.2% 22.5%
1965 5.4% 4.1% 34.4%
1966 15.0% 10.2% 35.6%
1967 5.5% 3.7% 26.6%
1968 9.2% 2.0% 32.7%
AVERAGE 8.6% 4.6% 32.9%
By almost universal acclaim, 2. the Warren Court's most im-
portant developments occurred in race relations, criminal procedure,
reapportionment of voting districts, free speech, privacy, and social
welfare law. In all of these areas, the Court took an an activist gen-
eral demeanor, and pursued its policies aggressively.
In the race relations area, the Court took a number of impor-
tant steps. Continuing the equal protection revolution begun in
Brown v. Board of Education,'" it extended the prohibition against
segregation in public services 2 4 and nullified schemes devised to
220. 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (6-2 decision).
221. 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (6-2 decision).
222. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT (1973); A. Cox, THE
WARREN COURT (1968); P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN
COURT (1970); H. SPAETH, THE WARREN COURT (1966).
223. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
224. E.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courtrooms); Turner v. City of
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evade the ban.22 In addition, the Court cast a protective net over
civil rights demonstrators. 26 The Court upheld both the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 .2 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,28 and gave new
life to the Civil Rights Act of 1866.29
The Court accomplished a criminal procedure revolution as
well. One by one, it made the fundamental provisions of the Bill of
Rights applicable to the States by incorporating them in the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. 30 The Court further ex-
panded and elaborated these provisions,2 3' and at times issued de-
tailed sets of prophylactic rules to insure compliance. 32 By the end
of the 1960's the Court had written a lengthy constitutional code of
criminal procedure applicable equally to state and federal trials.23
The Court required and supervised the reapportionment of leg-
islative districts throughout the nation.23 4 It overruled precedent and
held the issue of voter apportionment justiciable.23 6 The Court for-
mulated a strict one person, one vote rule 236 which was later applied
Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (airports).
225. E.g., Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (schools; freedom of choice plan);
Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (schools; delay); Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S.
218 (1964) (schools; closing public schools); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963)
(schools; pupil transfer plan).
226. E.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379
U.S. 306 (1964); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157
(1961) (first in the series); but see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
227. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
228. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966).
229. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
230. E.g., Benton v, Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth amendment; double jeop-
ardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment; jury trial); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment; confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (fifth amendment; self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(sixth amendment; right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth
amendment; cruel and unusual punishments).
231. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (fourth amendment); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (fourth amendment); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128
(1967) (sixth amendment; right to counsel); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (sixth
amendment; confrontation); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (fourth amend-
ment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile proceedings); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (fifth amendment; self-incrimination).
232. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
233. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
929 (1965).
234. Earl Warren believed this was the most important line of cases during his tenure.
E. WARREN, MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
235. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
236. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 186 (1963).
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to the United States House of Representatives,"'7 both houses of
state legislatures,238 and local government units having general gov-
ernmental power.2"9 The Court insisted throughout on precise math-
ematical equality wherever feasible. 40
The Court also expanded legal protections for speech and asso-
ciation. It rejected defamation actions against public officials 24' and
public figures24 2 in the absence of actual malice and imposed tighter
limits on obscenity prosecutions. 243 The Court provided greater ac-
cess to private shopping centers for persons seeking forums for
expression.244
The Court made new law in an effort to protect the privacy of
individuals from the assaults of modern technology and government.
It redefined the fourth amendment to include electronic surveil-
lance 245 and invalidated New York's wiretapping law. 24" Further-
more, in Griswold v. Connecticut it laid the basis for a new constitu-
tional right of privacy in personal decisionmaking.2 47
The Court conducted an activist campaign on behalf of the poor
in a variety of areas. It struck down laws adversely affecting welfare
recipients,24a protected debtors against creditors, '2 4 9 and sought to in-
sure equal procedural protection for indigent criminal defendants. 5 °
The Court held poll taxes unconstitutional251 and suggested that
statutes adversely affecting the poor were subject to strict judicial
scrutiny. 52 The Court continued to give broad power to the legisla-
tive branch to regulate economic enterprise.253
237. Wesberry v Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
238. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
239. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
240. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526
(1969).
241. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
242. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
243. E.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966).
244. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968).
245. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
246. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
247. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
248. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968).
249. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
250. E.g.,, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
251. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
252. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
253. E.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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In general, the Court sought to make the federal judiciary "ac-
tivist" in the pursuit of its preferred values. It eased requirements
for access to the courts and created new causes of action. It elimi-
nated procedural hurdles. The Court reached out to resolve impor-
tant constitutional issues even where the case did not require it. It
overruled precedents freely and gave broad remedial powers and re-
sponsibilities to lower federal courts. In all, the Warren Court of the
1960's was a liberal, activist Court.
D. The Burger Court (1969-Present)
Beginning in 1969, the United States Supreme Court under-
went one of the most dramatic changes in its entire history, as the
liberal dominance of the late Warren era gave way to the conserva-
tive dominance characteristic of the Burger era. 64
As noteworthy as the personnel changes on the Court were, re-
call the political climate at the start of the Burger era. The 1960's
reform movements that were inspired by principles of love, peace,
and justice had transformed into a ruinous state of violence and divi-
siveness. Shaken by riots, bombings, and threats of violence, a "silent
majority" turned to the right and brought Richard M. Nixon into
power on a "law and order" platform in the 1968 presidential elec-
tion. Nixon, a conservative devoted to the annihilation of the New
Deal, took office at a crucial moment as two openings appeared on
the Court.255 Like most presidents before him, Nixon consciously
sought and found jurists who agreed with his political views.2 56
The October 1969 Term was a period of transition. The loss of
Warren and Fortas reduced the liberal wing to three (Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall) and destroyed the liberal majority status.
On the first day of the Term, conservative Warren E. Burger,2 57 was
254. See Galloway, The First Decade of the Burger Court: Conservative Dominance
(1969-1979), 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 891 (1981).
255. Warren announced his resignation in 1968. President Johnson nominated Fortas to
succeed Warren as Chief Justice. Opposition mounted, and Fortas resigned in early 1969.
256. In his campaign, Nixon pledged "to nominate to the Supreme Court individuals
who shared my judicial philosophy, which is basically a conservative philosophy." R. NIXON,
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 1055 (1972).
257. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 23, at 3111-42. Burger had been a
corporate lawyer in Minneapolis (1931-53), an assistant attorney general in the Eisenhower
Administration (1953.56), and a leader of the conservative wing of the District of Columbia
Circuit (1956-69). "Being one of the most articulate of conservative judges, Burger was often
their spokesman on issues of constitutional and criminal law . . . . He had written on the
bench the same sort of protest to the prevailing judicial activism and liberalism that Mr. Nixon
had delivered from the campaign stump .... Burger was then, clearly enough, Mr. Nixon's
kind of judge." Id. at 3113.
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sworn in to replace Earl Warren as Chief Justice. This increased the
conservative wing back to three: Burger, Harlan, and Stewart. Jus-
tices Black and White were aligned in the center between the two
wings. Fortas' seat remained vacant throughout the Term.
As expected, Burger aligned himself with the conservatives dur-
ing his first Term on the Court. In fact, Burger had the most con-
servative record of any Justice during the Term. He disagreed with
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall substantially more than Harlan,
who was previously the Court's most conservative member, did.
Harlan was ousted from his position as the Court's most conservative
member for the first time since the resignation of Frankfurter and
Whittaker in April 1962.
Voting data for the October 1969 Term show a distinct swing
to the right from the prior Term."' The dissent rates of the two
most liberal Justices, Douglas and Brennan, jumped, while those of
the two most conservative Justices, Harlan and Stewart, plummeted.
The swing to the right did not, however, go far enough to establish
conservative dominance. On the contrary, the highest dissent rate on
the Court belonged to the most conservative Justice (Burger, 29.1%).
Moreover, the Court's three most conservative members cast more
total dissents than its three most liberal members. In fact, a number
of the Term's most famous cases were liberal victories.289
Harry A. Blackmun was seated on the first day of the October
1970 term.260 Blackmun immediately joined Burger on the Court's
far right. In Blackmun's first Term, the two disagreed in only 4.7%
of the cases (5 out of 106). This was by far the lowest disagreement
rate between any two Justices on the Court, and it earned them the
nickname "Minnesota Twins."" 1  Blackmun's voting record during
the Term was the most conservative on the entire Court. Overall, he
258. Conservative victories in divided decisions during the Term, included: Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (5-3 decision) (criminal procedure; six-person jury); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (5-3 decision) (equal protection; welfare maximum grant re-
strictions); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (5-2 decision) (race; closing of public park).
259. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (5-3 decision) (criminal procedure; proof
beyond a reasonable doubt); Goldberg v. Kelly 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (5-3 decision) (procedural
due process; right to hearing before termination of welfare benefits); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (8-0 decision) (standing); Alexander v.
Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (8-0 decision) (race; school desegregation).
260. See 5 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SU-
PREME COURT, 3-12 (1978). Blackmun, another former corporation lawyer and conservative
federal appellate judge, was chosen because he shared Nixon's and Burger's commitment to
law and order and judicial restraint.
261. Both Justices are from St. Paul, Minnesota. In fact, they went to grade school
together, and Blackmun was best man at Burger's wedding.
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disagreed with the three liberals more frequently than either Burger
or Harlan did.
The swing to the right, begun during the prior Term, acceler-
ated. The dissent rates of the three liberal Justices jumped dramati-
cally; Marshall's dissent rate quintupled, Brennan's rate doubled,
and Douglas' rate (41.3%) was his highest since the October 1953
Term. In contrast, Burger dissented less than half as often as during
the prior Term. 62 His dissent rate (13.0%) was less than a third of
Douglas'. The following table contains data illustrating these trends.
TABLE 41
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1968,1969 & 1970 TERMS
OCT. 1968 OCT. 1969 OCT. 1970
JUSTICE TERM TERM TERM CHANGE
Douglas 22.2% 27.9% 41.3% +19.1%
Brennan 2.0% 12.5% 29.6% + 27.6%
Marshall 6.7% 5.1% 27.1% +20.4%
Burger - 1 29.1% 13.0% 1 - 16.1%
In contrast to the prior Term, when the liberals retained a
slight advantage, the conservatives had a clear edge during the Octo-
ber 1970 Term.2 68 The dissent rates of the three liberals were higher
than those of the three conservatives. Not since the October 1953
Term had the liberals performed so poorly in comparison to the con-
servatives in the won-lost figures. The conservative dominance char-
acteristic of the Burger era had begun.
262. The extent of the Court's swing to the right is strikingly apparent from the fact
that Burger had the highest dissent rate on the Court during the October 1969 Term and the
lowest dissent rate on the Court during the October 1970 Term.
263. Conservative victories during the Term included: Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971) (6-3 decision) (legislative apportionment); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; death penalty); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; Miranda); Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council, Inc., v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) (5-4 decision) (attorney oath); Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (8-1 decision) (abstention); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971)
(5-4 decision) (welfare; home visits).
On the other hand, some significant liberal decisions were issued during the October 1970
Term. E.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (6-3 decision) (free
speech); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (6-3 decision) (damage
suits for fourth amendment violations); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (9-0 deci-
sion) (welfare rights of nonresident aliens); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 14 (1971) (5-4
decision) (free speech; profanity) Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971) (9-0 decision) (race; school desegregation); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) (employment discrimination); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (9-0 decision) (crimi-
nal procedure; equal protection); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (8-1 decision)
(due process); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (5-4 decision) (admission to practice law;
inquiry into Communist affiliations).
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The shift in the balance of power to the conservative side was
reflected in the voting patterns of Stewart and White. Both were
much closer to the conservatives than to the liberals. Although not as
conservative as Blackmun and Burger, Stewart and White were at
least as conservative as Harlan. Their low disagreement rates with
the Nixon appointees were a signal of the Court's rightward shift.
This was the final Term for two of the Court's giants, Harlan
and Black. Harlan, a conservative, maintained his usual high disa-
greement rate with Douglas (46.6%), but was otherwise surprisingly
moderate. During Black's last Term he continued his swing to the
right. He disagreed with the two Nixon appointees less often than
with his former colleagues in the liberal wing, as the following table
shows.
TABLE 42
DATA CONCERNING BLACK'S DISAGREEMENTS-OCTOBER 1970 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE DISAGREEMENT
WITH BLACK WITH BLACK
LIBERAL
Douglas 36 35.0%
Brennan 36 33.6%
Marshall 38 35.8%
CONSERVATIVE
Burger 27 25.2%
Blackmun 31 29.0%
When the October 1971 Term opened, there were two vacant
seats on the Court. During the recess, both Black and Harlan had
resigned because of illness. To replace them, President Nixon ap-
pointed Lewis F. Powell, Jr.264 and William H. Rehnquist. 26 5 With
the seating of Powell and Rehnquist on January 7, 1972, the
"Nixon Court" was complete, and the Court entered a period of
nearly four years without personnel changes.
264. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 260, at 63-83. Powell, a conservative
corporate attorney from Richmond, Virginia, and a "pillar of the American legal establish-
ment" (id. at 64), moved promptly into a close alliance with Burger and has been a core
conservative throughout most of his tenure.
265. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 260, at 109-31. "When he took his
seat in 1972, his [Rehnquist's] ideology was clear to his supporters and opponents alike - an
ideology that President Richard M. Nixon, who appointed him, described somewhat imper-
fectly as that of a judicial conservative." Id. at 109. Rehnquist is probably the most conserva-
tive Justice appointed since the constitutional revolution of 1937.
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Like Burger during the October 1969 Term and Blackmun
during the October 1970 Term, Rehnquist and Powell promptly al-
igned on the far right of the Court. Indeed, each voted at least as
conservatively as Burger and Blackmun, as the following table
suggests.
TABLE 43
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1972 TERM
BLACKMUN BURGER POWELL REHNQUIST
DOUGLAS 57.9% 60.9% 58.1% 61.5%
BRENNAN 42.4% 47.2% 50.8% 48.5%
MARSHALL 39.4% 44.2% 54.0% 53.0%
The four Nixon appointees formed a cohesive conservative block
during their first Term together on the Court. They received strong
support from White, who stood distinctly to the right of the center
during the Term. Justice Stewart was approximately at the center of
the Court. Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall held down the left
wing.
The prevailing bloc alignment of the 1972-75 period, after the
seating of Powell and Rehnquist, is shown in the following table.
TABLE 44
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1972 THROUGH 1974 TERMS
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Douglas White 30 Rehnquist
Brennan Stewart ON Burger
Marshall Powell
Blackmun
Naturally, the conservative wing prevailed in most of the divided
cases. The shift from a 6-3 liberal majority in 1969 to a 6-3 con-
servative majority in 1972 is one of the most radical short-term
changes in the history of the Court.
The pattern of conservative dominance that began in the Octo-
ber 1970 Term continued during the October 1971 Term. The con-
servative wing, strengthened by the arrival of Powell and Rehnquist,
began in earnest to roll back the liberal-activist doctrines of the War-
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ren Court. For example, in Jefferson v. Hackney260 the Court held,
for the first time, that the equal protection clause bans only "inten-
tional" racial discrimination against ethnic minorities. Kirby v. Illi-
noiS2 7 held that defendants are not entitled to sixth amendment as-
sistance of counsel before the start of formal criminal prosecutions.
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis2 8 held that racial segregation of pri-
vate clubs does not violate the equal protection clause. The Court's
holding in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner2" restricted first amendment ac-
cess rights to private shopping centers. The decision in Board of Re-
gents v. Roth 270 destroyed the constitutional underpinnings of the
"new property" protected by earlier decisions.27  And the conserva-
tives had other major victories as well.2 7 2 In all, it was a strongly
conservative Term.
At the start of the October 1972 Term, the presidential cam-
paign was in full swing. The 1972 election offered the nation a
choice between conservative incumbent Richard M. Nixon and lib-
eral challenger George McGovern. The November election produced
a landslide for Nixon and his platform calling for "law and order,"
the rights of the "silent majority," and the dismantling of the welfare
state.
The October 1972 Term, the first full Term for the four Nix-
onians, was very conservative. As the following table shows, dissent
rates on the left were up from the prior Term, and reached levels far
above those on the right.
266. 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (5-4 decision).
267. 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (5-4 decision).
268. 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (6-3 decision).
269. 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (5-4 decision).
270. 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (5-3 decision).
271. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
272. E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1971) (5-4 decision) (free press); Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (5-4 decision) (domestic surveillance); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; jury trial); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; jury trial).
There were also some liberal victories during the October 1971 Term. E.g., Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; death penalty); Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure; grand jury); Wright v.
Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (5-4 decision) (race; school desegregation); United
States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (8-0 decision) (electronic surveil-
lance); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (4-3 decision) (procedural due process); Lynch
v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (5-4 decision) (procedural due process);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (6-1 decision) (equal protection; contraceptives).
[Vol. 24
THE SUPREME COURT
TABLE 45
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1971 & 1972 TERMS
OCT. 1971 OCT. 1972
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Douglas 43.8% 50.7% + 6.9%
Brennan 31.5% 34.8% + 3.3%
Marshall 25.6% 32.6% + 7.0%
CONSERVATIVE
Powell 19.0% 10.6% -8.4%
Blackmun 16.5% 8.7% -7.8%
Burger 18.6% 13.6% - 5.0%
Each of the three liberals achieved a new personal dissent record,
and Douglas' dissent rate (50.7%) was the highest since the Febru-
ary 1793 Term.
The collapse of the liberal bloc can be illustrated in many ways.
The following table, for example, compares the liberals' dissent rates
during the October 1968 and 1972 Terms.
TABLE 46
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1968 & 1972 TERMS
OCT. 1968 OCT. 1972
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
Douglas 18.3% 50.7% + 32.4%
Brennan 2.0% 34.8% + 32.8%
Marshall 6.7% 32.6% + 26.9%
The conservative wing took advantage of its dominant position, and
inflicted major losses on the liberals in a series of split decisions
touching a wide array of issues. 27 1
273. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (5-4 decision) (free speech, obscen-
ity); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure, con-
sent searches); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (5-3 decision) (freedom of religion;
three-prong establishment clause test); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973) (5-4 decision) (equal protection; financing of public schools); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U.S. 656 (1973) (5-4 decision) (equal protection; filing fees).
Nonetheless, there were also some important liberal victories during the October 1972
Term. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(6-3 decision) (freedom of religion; establishment clause); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)
(7-2 decision) (equal protection; aliens); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (6-2
decision) (race; school desegregation); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (8-1 deci-
sion) (equal protection; sex discrimination); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (7-2 decision)
(abortion).
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Polarization between the Court's extremes remained very high
during the October 1972 Term. The disagreement rate between
Douglas and Rehnquist of 66.2% was a modern Supreme Court rec-
ord. Seven pairs of Justices had disagreement rates above fifty per-
cent. Notably, Douglas disagreed with each of the five conservatives
in more than fifty percent of the cases. Bloc voting occurred fre-
quently. In thirty-two cases, the entire liberal wing (Douglas, Bren-
nan, and Marshall) dissented. Reflecting the high degree of polariza-
tion, the average number of dissents per case (2.16) was both the
highest of the Burger Court's first decade and one of the highest in
the history of the Court.
The October 1973 and 1974 Terms were dominated by the
same six-vote coalition of conservatives and moderate conservatives.
Rehnquist and Burger were on the far right during both Terms.
Powell and Blackmun swapped the third and fourth most conserva-
tive positions. Stewart moved back to the right into the fifth most
conservative slot. White was next in order, more moderate than in
the prior Terms, but still right of center. Marshall, Brennan, and
Douglas completed the line-up from right to left. The flood of con-
servative victories in divided cases continued.2"4 Although the liberals
won a few divided cases during this period,2"5 overall, the Court
274. During the October 1973 Term, important conservative victories involving three or
more dissents by the liberals and moderates included the following cases: Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717 (1973) (5-4 decision) (race; school desegregation); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (6-3 decision) (standing); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (5-4 decision) (standing); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600 (1974) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; equal protection); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
lin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (6-3 decision) (civil procedure; class actions); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (5-4 decision) (procedural due process); California Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (6-3 decision) (privacy; constitutionality of Bank Secrecy Act of
1970); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (5-4 decision) (eleventh amendment; retroac-
tive welfare benefits); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (6-3 decision) (race; case or
controversy); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (6-3 decision) (criminal proce-
dure; search incident to arrest).
In the October 1974 Term, conservative victories included: Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749 (1975) (6-3 decision) (irrebuttable presumptions; Social Security benefits); Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (5-4 decision) (standing); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (5-2 decision) (attorneys' fees); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975) (5-4 decision) (equal protection; sex discrimination); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975) (6-3 decision) (residency requirement); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345 (1974) (6-3 decision) (procedural due process; state action).
275. Liberal victories in divided cases included: Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806
(1975) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; right to appear in pro per). North Ga. Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (6-3 decision) (procedural due process; debtor-
creditor); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (5-4 decision) (procedural due process; students'
rights); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (6-3 decision) (free
speech, defamation).
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fully satisfied Nixon's expectations.
The Court's personnel underwent another face lift during the
October 1975 Term with the retirement of William 0. Douglas.
President Ford appointed John Paul Stevens to replace Douglas. 276
Although Stevens is a moderate, he has been one of the more liberal
members of the very conservative Burger Court. During his first
Term, for example, Stevens had the third most liberal voting record
after Brennan and Marshall. The Douglas-Stevens succession
marked still another milestone in the Court's journey to the right
which began in 1969.
The October 1975 Term was Stevens' first, and it was com-
pletely dominated by the conservatives and moderate conservatives."'
To illustrate, Brennan and Marshall, the two remaining liberals,
cast almost as many dissenting votes (100) as all six holdover mem-
bers of the conservative wing (105). The dissent rates of the conserv-
atives remained at the very low levels that had characterized prior
Terms. The following table illustrates the conservative dominance by
comparing the dissent rates of the liberal Justices, Brennan and
Marshall, and the conservative Justices, Burger and Powell.
276. See L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 260, at 149-62. Stevens is a former
Chicago attorney and Seventh Circuit Judge.
277. Important conservative victories over dissents by Brennan and Marshall included
the following landmark cases: Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (6-3 decision) (criminal
procedure; habeas corpus); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (7-2 decision) (criminal
procedure; death penalty); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (7-2 decision) (crimi-
nal procedure; search and seizure); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)
(6-2 decision) (race; school desegregation); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50 (1976) (5-4 decision) (free speech; zoning); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (5-4 decision) (commerce clause; States's rights); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) (7-2 decision) (race; intent to discriminate); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
(6-2 decision) (free speech; access); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (5-3 decision) (due
process); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (6-2 decision) (free speech; access); Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (5-3 decision) (free speech; defamation); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (6-2 decision) (procedural due process); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362 (1976) (5-3 decision) (case or controversy).
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TABLE 47
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1975 TERM
DISSENT CHANGE FROM
JUSTICE RATE PRIOR TERM
LIBERAL
Brennan 38.4% + 9.7%
Marshall 34.8% + 10.4%
CONSERVATIVE
Powell 4.4% - 6.9%
Burger 9.4% - 3.6%
Brennan's dissent rate of 38.4% was a personal record. In contrast,
Powell's dissent rate of 4.4% was the lowest of any Justice since the
October 1968 Term. Polarization between the Justices at the Court's
extremes remained at the very high levels characteristic of the mod-
ern Court. During the October 1975 Term, Rehnquist disagreed
with Brennan in 58.7% of the cases and with Marshall in 55.6% of
the cases.
The line-up that emerged after the seating of Stevens, and that
tended to prevail until 1981, is shown in the following table.
TABLE 48
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1975 THROUGH 1980 TERMS
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Brennan White - Rehnquist
Marshall Stewart - Burger
Stevens Powell
Blackmun
Voting patterns during the October 1976 Term were very simi-
lar to those of the prior Term. Rehnquist and Burger were aligned
on the far right, and Brennan and Marshall on the far left. Powell
and Blackmun sided closely with Rehnquist and Burger. White and
Stewart were more moderate, but they retained their usual tilt to the
right. Stevens, in contrast, leaned slightly to the left, disagreeing with
Rehnquist (40.2%) and Burger (36.1%) more than with Brennan
(28.5%) and Marshall (28.9%).
Dissent and disagreement rates were rather high during the Oc-
tober 1976 Term. In the liberal wing, the dissent rates remained at
or near record levels for both Brennan and Marshall. Notably, the
dissent rates of the Court's three most conservative members in-
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creased. Evidently the trend of Court decisions gave the conservatives
some new ground for discontent.178 Yet in spite of the higher dissent
rates on the right, the Term was characterized by continuing con-
servative dominance.279 This is clear when one considers that the two
liberals cast more total dissents (91) than all four core conservatives
(71).
During the October 1977 Term, a number of interesting
changes emerged in the voting patterns of the Justices. The align-
ment of the Court's extremes remained the same with Rehnquist and
Burger on the far right, and Brennan and Marshall on the far
left.28 The other Justices, however, shifted their alignments dramat-
ically. White moved to the left of center for the first time since the
October 1963 Term. The following table shows White's substantial
shift to the left after his sojourn in the conservative bloc during the
early 1970's.
278. Important liberal victories in divided cases included: Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; capital punishment); Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (7-2 decision) (presidential papers); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977) (5-4 decision) (free speech; attorney solicitation); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432
U.S. 1 (1977) (5-4 decision) (equal protection; aliens); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977) (7-2 decision) (right of privacy; contraceptives); Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (5-4 decision) (right of privacy; family living arrangements);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (6-3 decision) (free speech; "Live Free or Die"
license plates); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (5-4 decision) (criminal procedure;
right to counsel); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S 190 (1976) (7-2 decision) (equal protection; sex
discrimination).
279. Important conservative victories over dissents by Brennan and Marshall during the
October 1977 Term included: Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (6-3 decision) (right of pri-
vacy; abortions); International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (7-2
decision) (race; employment discrimination); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1 (1977) (4-3 decision) (contract clause); Ingraham v. Wright 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (5-4 deci-
sion) (procedural due process; school discipline); United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413
(1977) (6-3 decision) (criminal procedure; electronic surveillance); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (5-3 decision) (equal pro-
tection; racial discrimination; intent to discriminate).
280. Disagreement rates between the Court's extremes were once again very high:
Rehnquist-Brennan (58.3%), Burger-Brennan (54.6%), and Rehnquist-Marshall (53.5%).
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TABLE 49
WHITE'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1972 & 1977 TERMS
OCT. 1972 OCT. 1977
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Brennan 42.9% 31.5% -11.4%
Marshall 40.6% 29.9% -10.7%
CONSERVATIVE
Burger 19.6% 34.9% + 15.3%
Rehnquist 19.7% 40.3% + 20.6%
Stewart also moved sharply away from the Rehnquist-Burger pole
toward a position slightly to the left of the Court's center.
Most notably, Justices Powell and Blackmun moved substan-
tially to the left. Powell was almost exactly in the statistical center of
the Court during the October 1977 Term, in striking contrast to
prior Terms when he voted as a core conservative in close alignment
with Burger and Rehnquist. Similarly, Blackmun's disagreement
rate with Rehnquist jumped from 14.7% to 41.3%, and his disagree-
ment rate with Burger jumped from 10.9% to 33.9%, suggesting that
the "Minnesota Twins" nickname was no longer accurate. Stevens,
in contrast, moved to the right into the fourth most conservative
position.
As a result of all these developments, the balance of power
shifted to the left during the October 1977 Term.2 81 Instead of the 6-
3 conservative majority of prior Terms, the alignment was 2-5-2.
After seven consecutive Terms during which the liberals cast a dis-
proportionate share of dissents, the distribution of dissents was now
more balanced.
281. Liberal victories in divided cases included: Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978) (7-2 decision) (criminal procedure; search and seizure); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1977) (6-3 decision) (eminent domain); Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (7-2 decision) (civil rights; suits against municipal corpo-
rations); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (6-3 decision) (proce-
dural due process; cutoff of utilities); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978) (7-2 decision)
(equal protection; nonresident college tuition); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125
(1978) (6-3 decision) (freedom of religion).
On the other hand, there were many important conservative victories as well during he
October 1977 Term. E.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (5-4 decision)
(free speech); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (5-3 decision)
(contract clause); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S 547 (1978) (5-3 decision) (criminal
procedure; search and seizure); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (7-2 decision)
(criminal procedure; electronic surveillance); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435
U.S. 589 (1978) (5-4 decision) (access to White House tape recordings).
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TABLE 50
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1976 & 1977 TERMS
OCT. 1976 OCT. 1977
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERAL
Brennan 37.3% 34.3% -3.0%
Marshall 35.5% 28.3% 
-7.2%
CONSERVATIVE
Burger 16.8% 22.5% +5.7%
Rehnquist 21.8% 30.2% +8.4%
In short, voting data for the October 1977 Term suggested that the
Burger Court was entering a new period in which control passed
from the right wing to the center.28s
Voting data for the October 1978 through 1980 Terms reveal a
strikingly consistent pattern. In each of the three Terms, Rehnquist
and Burger aligned on the far right. After his brief stay at the
Court's center during the October 1977 Term, Powell moved sharply
back to the right and resumed his usual close alliance with Burger.
Stewart was definitely right-of-center in his last three Terms on the
Court, and posted an overall voting record much like Powell's.
White was almost precisely in the statistical center between the
Rehnquist-Burger and Marshall-Brennan poles, leaning only
slightly to the right. Blackmun also was in the center. Unlike Pow-
ell, Blackmun's split with the conservative wing in the October 1977
Term stuck, and he was a statistical moderate throughout the rest of
the 1970's. Stevens returned to his accustomed position as third most
liberal Justice, lining up slightly left of center during all three
Terms. As Marshall and Brennan went their lonely way in the
Court's underpopulated liberal wing, the following line-up
prevailed.
282. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN, INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979), which ends with the following sentence: "The center was in control." Id. at
444.
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TABLE 51
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1978 THROUGH 1980 TERMS
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Marshall Stewart -* Rehnquist
Brennan White Burger
Blackmun Powell
Stevens
The polarization of Justices at the Court's extremes continued
at the extremely high levels characteristic of the Burger era. Rehn-
quist posted exceptionally high disagreement rates with both Mar-
shall (57.7%) and Brennan (56.2%). In fact, he disagreed with both
of the liberals in virtually two out of every three cases decided in the
October 1979 Term.
The conservatives and moderates dominated the Court from the
October 1978 through 1980 Terms. The lowest dissent rates were
posted by White (13.4%), Burger (13.8%), Blackmun (15.2%), and
Powell (15.7%). Rehnquist dissented more often (24.4%), calling
from the far right for more aggressive conservatism by the Court.
The Court's three most liberal members posted the highest dissent
rates for the three-year period: Marshall (33.9%), Brennan (32.3%),
and Stevens (24.8%). Major conservative victories were registered in
cases involving criminal procedure,'" 3 equal protection, 8 4 privacy, 8 5
283. E.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S 454 (1981) (6-3 decision) (fourth amendment;
searches incident to arrest); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (6-3 decision) (fourth
amendment; "limited intrusions"); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (5-4 decision)
(equal protection; right to counsel); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (5-4 decision)
(fourth amendment; "standing"); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (6-3 decision)
(fourth amendment; "standing"; federal supervisory power); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291 (1980) (6-3 decision) (privilege against self-incrimination; Miranda); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263 (1980) (5-4 decision) (cruel and unusual punishment; life sentence for three
petty thefts); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (5-4 decision) (public trial);
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (5-4 decision) (electronic surveillance; surrepti-
tious entry to plant bug); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (5-4 decision) (right to coun-
sel); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (5-4 decision) (fourth amendment; "standing").
284. E.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (6-3 decision) (sex; male only draft
registration); City of Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (6-3 decision) (race; traffic
barrier between black and white residential area); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S.
464 (1981) (5-4 decision) (sex; statutory rape); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (5-4
decision) (age; Social Security eligibility); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (5-4 deci-
sion) (illegitimates; survivor's benefits); Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979) (7-2 decision) (sex; veterans' preference); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (5-4
decision) (illegitimates; wrongful death suits); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (5-4
decision) (aliens); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (5-4 decision) (illegitimates; intestate
succession).
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freedom of expression,' and other important issues.287
At the start of the October 1981 Term, Sandra Day O'Connor
was sworn in to replace Potter Stewart. Stewart, a moderately con-
servative Cincinnati Republican, had been quite conservative in his
final years, but O'Connor probably deserves a more conservative la-
bel. The Court's first woman Justice, O'Connor was selected by
President Reagan from the Goldwater wing of the Arizona Republi-
can Party. Her voting record during her first three Terms suggests
that she initially aligned herself with the Court's conservative wing,
and sided with her former Stanford classmate and Arizona Bar col-
league, Rehnquist, in most divided cases. In short, for the sixth con-
secutive time, a Republican President placed a Justice on the Court
more conservative than the Justice's predecessor, producing the con-
servative alignment illustrated in the following table.
TABLE 52
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES - OCTOBER 1981 TERM
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Marshall Blackmun Rehnquist
Brennan White Burger
Stevens O'Connor
Powell
As of this writing, the Court's liberal wing seemingly is on the
brink of extinction. Brennan, age seventy-eight, and Marshall, age
seventy-five, have had recurrent health problems. It is unlikely they
can hold out until 1989, so the Court could soon be without liberals.
The conservative dominance characteristic of the Burger era will
likely remain for many more years.
285. E.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (6-3 decision) (abortion); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (5-4 decision) (abortion).
286. E.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (7-2 decision) (passport revocation); Hef-
fron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (5-4 decision)
(time, place, and manner regulations); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (5-4 decision)(prisoners' union); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (6-3 decision) (defamation; discov-
ery of author's thought processes).
287. E.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (5-4 decision)
(no right to counsel in parental status termination proceedings); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355(1981) (5-4 decision) (one person, one vote rule not applicable to water district); Pennhurst
State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (6-3 decision) (right to treatment);
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (5-4 decision) (taking);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (5-4 decision)(freedom of religion; establishment clause); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)(6-3 decision) (taking); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. (1979) (6-3 decision) (commitment of child).
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The Burger Court's conservative voting patterns described in
this section reflect conservative substantive and procedural legal de-
velopments. The five substantive areas in which the Warren Court's
most famous liberal-activist innovations occurred-race relations,
criminal procedure, free speech, privacy, and legislative reapportion-
ment-became some of those most affected by the Burger Court's
decisions.
The Burger Court has inflicted a series of severe defeats on ra-
cial minorities. The Court undercut the Warren Court's equal pro-
tection revolution by holding that the equal protection clause. 8 pro-
hibits only intentional racial discrimination,289 by tightening the
state action requirement, 290 and by restricting the power of federal
courts to issue effective remedies.291 After an initial period of relative
liberalism, . 92 the Burger Court limited the most important civil
rights statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by rolling
back major advances made by lower federal courts.291 Having effec-
tively shut the door on the Warren Court's racial equality revolu-
tion, the Court reopened it to some extent in a series of more moder-
ate decisions issued toward the end of the 1970's.2'9 The cumulative
288. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
289. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (zoning); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (employment tests); Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (school desegregation); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973) (school desegregation); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (welfare
benefits).
290. E.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (warehouseman's lien);
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (cut off of electricity to residence);
Moose Lodge No. 107 V. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (private clubs).
291. E.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (school desegrega-
tion); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (school desegre-
gation); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 990 (1976) (school desegregation);
NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (federal licensees); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (school desegregation); Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational
Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974) (selection of government officials).
292. E.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (retroactive seniority);
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (written tests; back pay); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (written tests).
293. See, in chronological order, International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977); East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977);
United Air Lines Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). The 1977 trilogy was a clear signal to
the lower courts to curtail the liberal activism that had been dominant in Title VII cases
throughout the early 1970's. The lower courts responded with a vengeance. As a result, the
flood of Title VII class actions on behalf of racial minorities has slowed to a trickle.
294. E.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (school desegrega-
tion); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (school desegregation); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (affirmative action); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (special admissions); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)
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effect of the Burger Court's decisions, however, has been a grievous
weakening of the advance toward racial justice that characterized
prior years.
The Burger Court responded to the Warren Court's criminal
procedure revolution by firmly embracing the "law and order" prin-
ciples that President Nixon both espoused and explicitly sought in
his appointees. The Court terminated the Warren Court's equal pro-
tection revolution on behalf of indigent criminal defendants,295 lim-
ited the right to counsel, 2 6 undercut Miranda,2 97 restricted the ex-
clusionary rule, 98 and otherwise eroded the fourth amendment.2 99
The Court eliminated safeguards against mistaken identifications, °°
watered down jury trial requirements, 801 reinstated capital punish-
ment,"'2 and drastically reduced the availability of habeas corpus. 03
Overall, the Court placed a higher value on crime control than on
constitutional protections and emphasized the need for eliminating
federal interference with local law enforcement policies. Although
many liberal decisions were also issued, the overall trend has been
undoubtedly conservative.
The Burger Court's record in free speech cases has been mixed.
In several important areas, characteristic conservative retrenchment
(jury discrimination); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (private schools; Civil Rights
Act of 1866); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (housing); Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (employment; Civil Rights Act of 1866).
295. E.g., United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600 (1974); Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
296. E.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
297. E.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96(1975); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
298. E.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
299. E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (standing); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978) (third-party evidence searches); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128(1978) (electronic surveillance); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory
searches); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (search of attorney's files); United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrantless arrests); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973) (searches incident to arrest); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)(consent searches); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (stops and frisks); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (consent monitoring).
300. E.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
301. E.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970).
302. E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
303. E.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976).
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has occurred. The Court rolled back the Warren Court's "public
defamation revolution."'3 04 It restored the ability of government offi-
cials to prosecute obscenity effectively,305 and it undercut the access
of grass-roots groups to means for expression of their views."' The
Court also terminated its own role as guardian of public demonstra-
tors. 80 Most notoriously, it conducted a vendetta against the press,
substantially curtailing the immunities and access rights of news me-
dia. 808 On the other hand, the Court held the line against prior re-
straints309 and even engaged in an activist campaign to expand pro-
tections for corporate speech 10 and commercial speech."' Overall,
however, the Court's commitment to the first amendment has been
spotty at best.
The Burger Court earned a reputation for liberal activism in
one noteworthy line of cases involving the right of privacy. The
Court held, for the first time, that pregnant women have a constitu-
tional right to an abortion" 2 and issued a variety of secondary deci-
sions implementing" 3 and eroding" 4 that right. The Court con-
firmed and extended the constitutional right of privacy in cases
involving the use of contraceptives, 13 the decision to marry,"' and
304. E.g., Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
305. E.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); cf. FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
306. E.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
307. E.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
308. E.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S.
1 (1978); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
309. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
310. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
311. E.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
312. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973).
313. E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379
(1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
314. E.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), and companion cases.
315. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); cf Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
316. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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the decision of family members to live together.3 17 Beyond that, how-
ever, the Court adopted a restrained position concerning the right of
privacy 8$ which led at least one observer to conclude, "[I]t is likely
that constitutional privacy will be relegated to the status of a 'limbo'
doctrine. ... 319
The legislative reapportionment revolution of which Earl War-
ren was so proud 2' held up reasonably well during the first decade
of the Burger era.32 1 Yet, the patterns of conservatism and retrench-
ment characteristic of the Burger Court are present in this area as
well. The Court softened the one-person, one-vote rule by allowing
minor deviations between the most and least populous districts with-
out any justification M  and substantial deviations where supported
by rational grounds 23 and by stressing deference to state legislativejudgments. 8 4 The Court rejected challenges to multi-member electo-
ral districts. 8  Finally, the Court continued the restrained pattern
set by the Warren Court in racial gerrymandering cases. 2 Gener-
ally, the Burger Court's decisions in this area "trace a retreat to the
safety of judicial noninvolvement."' 2
317. E.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
318. E.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425U.S. 901 (1976); Kelley v. Johnson 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974).
319. Silver, The Future of Constitutional Privacy, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 211, 215
(1977).
320. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its many progeny, including especiallyWells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); and
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
321. E.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690
(1971).
322. Typically the Court allowed deviations up to 10%. E.g., White v. Regester, 412U.S. 755 (1973) (9.9% deviation); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (7.83% devia-
tion). But cf Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975) (stricter standards for court-ordered
reapportionment).
323. E.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (16.4% deviation); Abate v. Mundt,
403 U.S. 182 (1971) (11.9% deviation).
324. E.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735(1973). But cf. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973) (no need for deference regarding federal
voting districts).
325. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). But cf. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1(1975) (stricter standards for court-ordered reapportionment); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755(1973) (multi-member districts held invidiously discriminatory).
326. E.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (redistricting with ad-
verse effect on Jewish community); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (nonretrogres-
sion principle for redistricting under the Voting Rights Act of 1965); City of Richmond v.
United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (racially motivated annexation upheld).
327. Comment, Judicial Deference in the Representation Controversy: A Further Ero-
sion of the Justiciability Doctrine, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 143, 143 (1977).
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In cases involving essentially economic interests, the Burger
Court terminated the "egalitarian revolution" that had characterized
the Warren era. The Court returned to a posture of restraint with
regard to government activities that adversely affect the poor. It un-
dercut the foundations of constitutional poverty law by holding that
poverty is not a suspect classification 8 and denying that subsistence
benefits are a fundamental right."29 The Court retrenched in the
area of equal protection for indigent criminal defendants." It re-
stricted the procedural due process rights of welfare recipients,
" 1
debtors, 3 2 and other persons harmed by government action. "8  The
Court set aside the Warren Court's rule that "the Government al-
ways wins" in antitrust cases,334 and it dramatically restricted the
rights of indigents to free access to judicial proceedings." Moreover,
a number of cases suggested renewed conservative activism, including
a willingness on the part of the Court to actively intervene in order
to advance the interests of the rich.3 6
Perhaps the most widely noted trend during the first decade of
the Burger era was the Court's insistence upon "'Closing the court-
house doors," or, in other words, restricting access to federal courts
and availability of federal remedies. 8 7 The Court used traditional
threshold doctrines to create formidable obstacles to judicial review.
The rules of standing were tightened drastically and constitutional-
ized. 38 The case or controversy " and justiciabilitys40 doctrines were
328. E.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
329. E.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
330. E.g., Ross v. Mofitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
331. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389 (1971).
332. E.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). But see North Ga. Finish-
ing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
333. E.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
334. For a discussion of cases illustrating this change see Pollock, Antitrust, the Su-
preme Court, and the Spirit of '76, 72 NW. U.L. REV. 631-55 (1978).
335. E.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434 (1973).
336. E.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1
(1977); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
337. See, e.g., Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1191 (1977).
The leaders in this development were Rehnquist, Burger, and Powell.
338. E.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 425 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 166
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
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used to dismiss important cases involving alleged abuse of govern-
mental power. The availability of federal habeas corpus was reduced
substantially. 4 The nonintervention doctrine became a major bar-
rier to federal litigation. 42 The Warren Court's presumption in
favor of private causes of action to enforce statutory rights was con-
verted into a presumption against private causes of action. 4 Rules
concerning pendant jurisdiction were tightened. 44 Those litigants
who managed to survive the gauntlet of threshold obstacles found
themselves up against newly imposed procedural obstacles. 43 Most
importantly, the Court imposed far-reaching restrictions on the abil-
ity of lower federal courts to issue effective remedies. 46 The Court's
recurrent obsession was to reduce the case load of the federal courts,
and its message to the federal judges was to dismiss the cases without
reaching the merits. In the long run, this position may result in
greater detriment to aggrieved citizens than all other instances of
substantive retrenchment, mentioned above.
III. CONCLUSION
The era of Supreme Court history that began with the constitu-
614 (1973); see e.g., Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Propos-
als for Legislative Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 863 (1977).
339. E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488
(1974).
340. E.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
341. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
342. The leading case in this important area was Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971). The progeny of Younger include: Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice
v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See, e.g., Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of
Equitable Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976 DUKE L. J. 523.
343. E.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Securities Investor Protec-
tion Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n
of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); see, e.g., Pillai, Negative Implication: The Demise of
Private Rights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1978) (concluding that
private causes of action are an "endangered species").
344. E.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
345. E.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (class actions); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (class actions); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973) (class actions).
346. E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Milliken v. Bradley (I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. 1 (1973); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); see, e.g., Goldstein, A
Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1978); Morrison, Rights Without Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal
Courts Out of the Business of Protecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REV 841 (1977).
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tional revolution of 1937 has had four major periods. First came the
relatively liberal Roosevelt Court (1937-46), with its early years of
liberal dominance (1937-41) and its later years of polarization and
discord (1941-46). Second came the more conservative Vinson Court
(1946-53), with its early years of polarization (1946-49), and later
years of 7-2 conservative dominance (1949-53). Next came the lib-
eral Warren Court (1953-69), with its early years of emerging lib-
eral activism (1954-58), its middle years of retrenchment and re-
straint (1958-62), and its later years of aggressive liberal activism
(1962-69). Finally, the Burger Court (1969-present) with its nearly
unbroken pattern of conservative dominance, exhibits a trend not
likely to end soon.
